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RECENT CASES
ON THE STREET
VAGRANCY STATUTE-PERSON
NEED NOT ACCOUNT FOR HIS PRESENCE TO AN INTERROGATING POLICE OFFICER ONCE HE HAS FURNISHED SUITABLE IDENTIFICATION-People v. Solomon;
33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973).
Arnold Solomon was charged with disorderly conduct under
the California vagrancy statute, Penal Code section 647, subdivision (e). 1 The trial court sustained Solomon's demurrer to the
People's complaint and entered judgment dismissing the cause of
action. The appellate department of the superior court reversed
the judgment of dismissal and certified the case to the California
Court of Appeal for the Second District.
It is not clear how Solomon violated the statute since the
Court of Appeal did not discuss the facts surrounding his arrest.
The resolution of this case was based, however, on the constitutionality of section 647, subdivision (e) of the California Penal
Code,2 and not on the specific facts of Solomon's arrest.
The only previous case which considered the validity of section 647(e) was People v. Weger,3 a 1967 California Court of
Appeal decision. In holding section 647(e) constitutional, the
Weger court stated that a suspected vagrant was required not
only to identify himself, but also to give an adequate account of his
presence to a police officer. 4 In contrast, the court in People v.
Solomon' construed section 647(e) more narrowly. Like the
court in Weger, the Solomon court held valid the statute's requirement that a suspected loiterer must furnish "suitable identification" when requested to do so by a police officer. 6 Unlike Weger,
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(e) (West 1972) provides in part:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor....
(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to
place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when requested by any police
officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.
2. Hereinafter referred to as section 647(e).
3. 251 Cal. App. 2d 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1967).
4. Id. at 595, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
5. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973).
6. Id. at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
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however, the Solomon court held that a suspected vagrant may
not be "arrested or prosecuted for failure to account for his presence or failure to give a satisfactory or even plausible account to
the interrogating officer." 7
The court reached its conclusion by considering the validity
of section 647(e) in light of relevant United States Supreme Court
decisions8 rendered subsequent to Weger. The Solomon court
interpreted these decisions9 as standing for the proposition that
the mere posing of questions to a suspected loiterer by interrogating officers in certain situations may intrude upon a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination. 10 Persuaded by these cases,
the court in Solomon reasoned that after a suspected street loiterer
has furnished "suitable identification" to an interrogating officer,
further questioning may infringe upon the suspect's fifth amendment rights."
Although the court in Solomon alluded to the promotion of
"public safety" as the principal goal of section 647(e), the purpose of the section is not altogether clear. Some commentators
contend that vagrancy laws are employed as a method of circumventing constitutional requirements. 2 Others argue that the "typical vagrancy law" is a vestige of feudal society, the effect of
which is to make "low status" a crime. 3 The Solomon court
distinguished the typical vagrancy statute from section 647(e)
by finding that the latter makes "conduct" a crime, while the
former makes "status" a crime. 4 The court noted that section
647(e) contains three elements-(l) refusal to furnish identity
(2) by one loitering on the streets (3) under circumstances that
7. Id.
8. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Palmer v.
City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971);
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), the Supreme Court overturned as violative of
the privilege against self-incrimination the requirement that gamblers register for
and pay federal occupational tax. In Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85
(1968), the Court held invalid a law requiring registration of proscribed firearms because it compelled registrants to incriminate themselves. In Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Court overturned Leary's conviction for
failure to comply with provisions of a marijuana transfer tax because compliance
and registration under the law would subject him to a high risk of incrimination.
10. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 437-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-73 (1973).
11. Id. at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
12. See Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment
of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. LAw BULL. 205, 226-27 (1967).
13. Walsh, Vagrancy: A Crime of Status, 2 SUFF. U.L. REV. 156 (1968).
14. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (1973).
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infringe upon the public safety-each of which must be proved

to convict a defendant of violating the statute.' 5 Thus, a conviction for vagrancy under section 647(e) must be based upon

the conduct of the defendant. In contrast, a conviction under the
typical vagrancy statute had frequently been founded upon the
defendant's low status.
An example of the so-called typical vagrancy statute is the
Jacksonville, Florida ordinance 6 discussed in Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville. 7 The ordinance provided, in part, that
persons who were rogues, common gamblers, jugglers, common

drunkards and habitual loafers were to be deemed vagrants.' s The
United States Supreme Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct was forbidden by
the statute, and because it encouraged arbitrary and erratic ar19
rests and convictions.

The Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality of an-

other vagrancy statute in Palmer v. City of Euclid."° The Euclid,

Ohio vagrancy ordinance, 2 ' though more comprehensive than the
Jacksonville ordinance, was held to be unconstitutionally vague
as applied. In Palmer, the defendant was arrested after he had

dropped off a friend at an apartment house and was talking on a
two-way radio while parked in the street. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the ordinance gave insufficient notice to
the defendant that he was without "visible and lawful business,"
15. Id.
16. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 provides:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or
plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons
neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually
living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be
claimed vagrants....
17. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
20. 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
21. EUCLID, OHIO, ORDINANCE § 583.01 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any suspicious person to be within the municipality. The following shall be deemed suspicious persons:
(e)

Any person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or
who is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without
visible or lawful business and who does not give satisfactory
account of himself.
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and hence that he was violating the vagrancy ordinance.22
The Solomon court stated that, in contrast to the Euclid
ordinance, section 647(e) was neither susceptible to arbitrary
administration nor lacking in standards to guide its application.
The court explained that section 647(e) becomes operative only
when surrounding circumstances suggest to a reasonable man
that some impairment of the public safety is imminent and such
circumstances can be objectively defined and articulated. 2 3
In addition to establishing that section 647(e) is not subject
to arbitrary administration, the court emphasized that the statute
could not be considered unconstitutionally vague. The Solomon
court set forth three factors which preclude section 647(e) from
from being held vague. First, the court stated that the person
requested to identify himself is put on direct notice as to what constitutes the unlawful conduct suspected since there must be a request for identification before there is any violation of the section. 24 However, the court does not explain how a suspect receives such notice. It seems clear, for example, that if a policeman requests a person's identification while he is merely walking
to the neighborhood store for groceries, the latter will not necessarily know the nature of the crime suspected. Second, the court
stated that the section only becomes operative "'when the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the public safety demands such identification.'"25 The
Solomon court's cursory discussion of the reasonable man standard in section 647(e) fails to fully explain why such standard is
capable of withstanding constitutional objections of vagueness.
However, the court does cite People v. Bruno2" in which section
647(e)'s reasonable man standard was examined and found to
overcome vagueness objections. 2 7 In Bruno, the court held that a
police officer operated within the confines of the section's reasonable man standard when he stopped the defendant while he was
in the immediate vicinity of a reported
walking along a 2street
8
prowling incident.
A final point which the Solomon court makes in refuting
vagueness objections to section 647(e) is that the reasonableness
of a police officer's belief in the threat to public safety posed by a
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971).
33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (1973).
Id. at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
Id., quoting CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(e) (West 1972).
211 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458, 462 (1962).
33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871 (1973).
211 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 862-63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458, 462-63 (1962).
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2
suspected vagrant is reviewable by an independent trier of fact. "
Although this factor probably does not make the section any less
vague, it clearly acts as an important check on the arbitrary enforcement of section 647(e).
In addition, the court rejected the contention that the section is vague by analogizing section30647(e)'s requirements to the
"standard" set out in Terry v. Ohio.
The court noted that unand frisk" a person
to
"stop
der Terry a policeman is entitled
when the information available to him warrants the belief by a
3
man of reasonable caution that police intervention is appropriate. '
Section 647(e) is said to square with the Terry standard because
it allows a policeman to act when the surrounding circumstances
the public safety demands idenindicate to a reasonable man that
32
tification of a suspected loiterer.
The court also discussed whether the privilege against selfincrimination prohibits imposing a duty on a suspected street loiterer to identify himself. First, the court looked to California v.
Byers 33 for the proposition that the "(d)isclosure of name and
address is an essentially neutral act" and not prohibited by the
fifth amendment. 3" Second, the court invoked a balancing test
to hold that section 647(e)'s requirement of identification does
35 In
not conflict with the privilege against self-incrimination.
balancing the public need for the protection of society from crime
against the individual's right of anonymity when walking on public thoroughfares, the Solomon court found the requirements of
public safety to be more important.
It is still too early to determine the effect of the Solomon
holding on vagrancy arrests and convictions under section 647(e).
However, it seems probable that the court's new interpretation of
the statute, limiting the circumstances under which an interrogating officer may require a suspected loiterer to account for his
presence, will lessen the likelihood of a violation of an alleged
vagrant's constitutional rights. This is particularly true with regard to fifth amendment rights since it is unlikely that a vagrancy
suspect will incriminate himself when he is merely required to
provide suitable identification to an interrogating officer.

Peter R. Boutin
29.

33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871 (1973).

30. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871 (1973).
32. Id.
33. 402 U.S.424, 431-32 (1971).

34. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (1973).
35. Id.
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THE "AREA TEST"-EVIDENCE ACQUIRED THROUGH
EAVESDROPPING ON CONVERSATIONS OF SUSPECT IN
CUSTODY MAY BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WHEN
THE SUSPECT HAS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY AS TO CONVERSATIONS-In Re Joseph A., 30
Cal. App. 3d 880, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1973), hearing denied,
(May 23, 1973).
On January 22, 1972, Joseph A., age fifteen, was arrested
on suspicion of murder in a stabbing incident. At the time of
his arrest, Joseph was advised of his constitutional rights, which
he refused to waive. Later in the day Joseph's uncle came to
visit him in the jail facility. The uncle requested that he be allowed
to see his nephew "by himself."
In compliance with this request, a jail official directed Joseph and his uncle to a small interrogation room in the jail. During their conversation, the
youth admitted to his uncle that he had stabbed the victim. Without the knowledge of either the uncle or the suspect, their conversation was electronically monitored and recorded. There was no
evidence of any representations made by police officers to the
uncle or Joseph to the effect that the conversation would be confidential; there was also no evidence that the uncle was serving
as a police agent.
Joseph appealed from a petition sustained by the juvenile
court containing a manslaughter allegation,' making him a ward
of the court and committing him to the California Youth Authority. He contended that the lower court erred in admitting into
evidence, over his objection, the monitored and recorded conversation between himself and his uncle. 2
The appellate court found no merit in Joseph's contention
that the recorded conversation was inadmissable because it was
monitored and recorded in violation of Title III of the federal
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,8 the California Invasion of Privacy Act,4 and the fourth amendment's proscription against unlawful search and seizure. The federal act
makes it a crime to willfully intercept or disclose any wire or
oral communication 5 and prohibits the introduction of evidence
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 192(1) (West 1971).

2. In re Joseph A., 30 Cal. App. 3d 880, 882, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731
(1973).
3. 18 U.S.C. 8H 2510-2520 (1970).
4.

CAL. PEN. CODE §

630-637.2 (West 1971).

5. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
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derived from such acts in any trial.6 The proscribed oral communication is defined within the act as "any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."' The California Penal Code makes it a
crime to electronically eavesdrop upon or record a confidential
communication8 and prohibits the admission of evidence derived
therefrom in any judicial proceedingY The court held that both
the federal and state statutes may be interpreted to exempt persons within jails or police stations since such persons have no
"reasonable expectation of privacy as to their conversations."' 10
The court in Joseph A. found this exception consistent with
the language of previous cases interpreting fourth amendment
rights" and affirmed on that basis.' 2
The court stressed that it was confining its decision to one
narrow issue: whether persons in a police station or jail facility
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their oral communications. 13 By answering this question in the negative, the court followed the general rule that one detained in jail cannot reasonably
expect to enjoy the privacy afforded to a person in a free society,
14
since lack of privacy is a necessary adjunct to imprisonment.
A jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an
automobile, an office, or a hotel room. "In prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day."' 5 Two
exceptions to this lack of privacy rule noted by the court are
conversations between persons occupying a privileged relationship, such as an attorney and client or a husband and wife;' 6 and
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. § 2515.
Id. § 2510.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 632(a) (West 1971).
Id. § 632(d).

10. In re Joseph A., 30 Cal. App. 3d 880, 883, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731
(1973).
11. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967):
What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of

Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. (citations omitted)
12. Since the court affirmed on the basis of the jail exception, it did not
pursue the plethora of constitutional and statutory issues raised by the petitioner
on appeal; see notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
13. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 732.

14. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962); North v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 309, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309,

104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837

(1972); People v. Morgan, 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 93, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840
(1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).

15. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
16. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 310-11, 502 P.2d 1305, 1310,
104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838 (1972).
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situations where the police represented that the communication
would be confidential 17 or where persons "were lulled into believing that their conversation would be confidential."' s The
Joseph A. court found neither of these exceptions applicable to
the conversation between the petitioner and his uncle. Concluding that the uncle's request to see the defendant "by himself"
was patently ambiguous,, the court found that the trial judge's
interpretation of the uncle's meaning as "away from other persons in custody" was reasonable and, therefore, binding.' 9
Lanza v. New York,20 a United States Supreme Court decision allegedly establishing the propriety of electronic eavesdropping as an adjunct to prison surveillance, was the source of the
"constitutionally protected area test" or "area test" applied by
the court in Joseph A.2

In Lanza jail officials intercepted a

conversation between the petitioner and his brother in the visiting room of the jail facility where the latter was confined. A
New York State legislative committee investigating abuses of the
state parole system subsequently used a record of this conversation to question the petitioner. Lanza refused to answer the committee's questions after a grant of immunity from prosecution
and was convicted for contempt. On appeal of the contempt conviction, Lanza claimed that the committee questioned him improperly because interception of the conversation with his brother constituted a violation of his rights under the fourth amendment's protection against unlawful search and seizure.2 2 In a
plurality opinion, the Supreme Court observed that a jail was an
unlikely area to be immunized from unreasonable search and seizure by the Constitution.23 The Court's underlying theory was
that a prisoner lacks sufficient proprietary interest in the jail premises to warrant protection of his privacy. 21 The Court held,
however, that the ultimate disposition of the Lanza case did not
require a resolution of the constitutional issue since the evidence
showed that two of the questions that Lanza refused to answer
were not in any way related to the intercepted conversation. 25
Application of the "area test" to a jail facility thus emerged as
dicta in the Lanza decision.2
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

People v. Blair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 249, 256, 82 Cal. Rptr. 673, 677 (1969).
8 Cal. 3d at 311, 502 P.2d at 1310, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
30 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
370 U.S. at 143.
30 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
370 U.S. at 139-141.
Id. at 142-144. Four Justices concurred in this portion of the opinion.

24. Id.

25. Id. at 145.
26. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented and
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Both the Joseph A. court and -the California cases 27 cited
in Joseph A. purport to follow Lanza in applying the "area test"
to a jail facility, but all of these decisions fail to observe that the
language in Lanza was dicta.28 The Joseph A. court linked its
application of the "area test" to the use of "reasonable security
measures" by jail authorities, 29 a policy consideration of secondary importance to the Lanza court. The Joseph A. court failed,
however, to provide sufficient guidelines for determining what
would constitute "reasonable security measures." The court neglected to indicate what prison security interests would be harmed
by judicial refusal to admit evidence obtained by secretive prison
surveillance where the evidence is totally unrelated to prison security. Conversations with a suspect cannot be equated with secretly conveying a dangerous weapon to the suspect. Yet, as a
result of modern technology, the former is seemingly less difficult to scrutinize than the latter.
The Joseph A. court also overlooked contradictions implicit
in the factual situation. When Joseph was arrested, he refused to
waive his right against self-incrimination. Specifically, he refused
to confess involvement in the stabbing incident to the arresting
officers. According to the reasoning of the court, the suspect immediately afterwards provided the jail authorities with information under circumstances amounting to voluntary self-incrimination, since he should have known he had no right to privacy in
the conversation with his uncle.3" Whether the court considered the petitioner's tacit consent to surveillance sufficient to overcome fifth amendment protection against such an act is not indicated in the decision. The court accepted the lower court's curious interpretation of the uncle's request to see Joseph "by himself" almost without comment. It seems inconceivable that Joseph's
uncle could have meant "away from others in custody" if he
was a concerned relative rather than a police agent. If prison
security is the basic policy underlying the decision, the court
failed to note any evidence linking this concern to the facts of
the case. Joseph had been in custody for less than twenty-four
hours when he was visited by his uncle; it is unlikely that he had
established any lines of contact with other prisoners suitable for
handling contraband or developing an escape plan."
labeled the plurality opinion a "gratuitous exposition of several grave constitutional issues confessedly not before [the Court] for decision." Id. at 148.
27. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr.
833 (1972); People v. Blair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 249, 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1969).
28. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.

29. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
30. Id.

31. Nothing in the factual record of the case indicated whether or not
Joseph's uncle had been physically searched for contraband.
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The application of the "area test" to a jail facility as illustrated in the Joseph A. decision has ominous implications. The
Joseph A. court neglected to distinguish between the general, tra-

ditional use of surveillance in jails, to prevent escapes and importation of contraband, and the special use of surveillance in this
32
case, to generate evidence to be introduced at petitioner's trial.

In the name of jail security a considerable degree of freedom is
removed from the individual, and geographic and temporal boundaries are placed on the right of privacy. 33

It is questionable

whether surveillance devices are "turned off' when visitors having
34

a "privileged" relationship to the suspect are allowed to see him.
The end result for the suspect and all his visitors may be no privacy whatsoever.3 5
Michael R. Burk

PARENT AND CHILD-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
NONSUPPORT-ENFORCING OBLIGATION FOR SUPPORT
ON FATHER INITIALLY AND ON MOTHER SECONDARILY IS NOT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION-People

v. Olague, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973).
The Los Angeles District Attorney brought an action against
a father for nonsupport of his child under Penal Code section 270,
imposing an obligation of support on both parents, but providing for proceedings to be directed initially against the father and

secondarily against the mother.' The father entered a demurrer to
32. The U.S. Supreme Court found no difficulty in distinguishing between
general and special surveillance. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court allowed general surveillance of prisoners while prohibiting evidence-gathering types of surveillance. Each of these decisions hinged on the "right to counsel" traditionally
associated with the sixth amendment, a point not raised in the Joseph A. case.
See Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth
Amendment Framework, 50 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1965).
33. King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent
Developments and Observations, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 240, 256 (1964). King
suggests that the "area test" stands in direct contradiction to the theory espoused by Warren and Brandeis in their classic article on "the right of privacy."
See Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
34. King, supra note 33, at 253.
35. Williams, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: A Defense Counsel's
View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 855 (1960).
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1973) provides in part:

If a father of either a legitimate or an illegitimate minor child willfully
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the charge on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional on
its face as a denial of equal protection. The demurrer was sustained and the action was dismissed.2
The District Attorney appealed to the appellate department

of the superior court,' which reversed the municipal court's decision, holding that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face
and that the defendant had presented no facts demonstrating its
arbitrariness. 4 The issue presented in this case was whether the

statute was so unreasonable on its face as to create an invidious
discrimination between fathers and mothers, thereby denying

equal protection of the law to fathers.
The test applied to decide whether a challenged statute constitutes a denial of equal protection is determined by the nature of
the interests involved. In cases involving suspect classifications5
or touching fundamental interests,' the state has the burden of
omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food,
shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his child, he
is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment .

. .

.

In

the event that the father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor
child [fails to provide such support], the mother of said child shall become subject to the provisions of this section and be criminally liable
for the support of said minor child during the period of failure on the
part of the father to the same extent and in the same manner as the
father ....
2. People v. Olague, No. M 126570 (Muni. Ct. of Los Angeles County).
3. CAL. RULES OF COURT §§ 182-187 (West Supp. 1973).
4. People v. Olague, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973).
5. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Supreme Court
directed itself to the issue of whether sex was an inherently suspect classification.
In an 8-1 decision, holding unconstitutional the distinction drawn between dependents of male members of the military and those of female members under
37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1971), and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1971), four members of the majority agreed that sex was inherently suspect and subject to strict
judicial scrutiny while the four other members specifically rejected this thesis
and agreed that such distinctions were to be resolved under the rational basis test.
The California Supreme Court directed itself to this issue in Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). The court,
holding unconstitutional a statutory prohibition against women bartenders,
unanimously agreed that classifications based upon sex are suspect. The court
stated that:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which
the class members are locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex from nonsuspect status, such as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect classifications is that
the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.
Id. at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); United States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968).
6. Fundamental rights are those personal or political rights that the
court considers so vital that they cannot be abridged by the state without a
clear showing of necessity, and then only by the least restrictive alternative.
The courts have recognized such rights as the right of a parent to the comfort of his child, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); the right to engage in
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establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies
the classification, but that the distinctions drawn by the law are
necessary to further its purpose. 7 Where fundamental interests
are not involved, the courts vest the legislative act with a "presumption of constitutionality and [require] merely that distinctions
drawn . . . bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose."'
The court concluded that there were no "fundamental personal or political rights" involved in this action, nor was this a
case of "suspect classification" based on sex. 10 Therefore the
court reasoned that the question to be resolved was "whether the
legislative command that enforcement of that obligation (to support) shall proceed first against one of those classes rather than
both is supported by articulable reasons.""
The father contended that invidious discrimination is shown
on the face of the statute because it impliedly admits that
mothers are equally capable, with fathers, of supporting their
children since they are subject to prosecution for nonsupport in
the event the father fails in his duty. The court correctly ex12
plains that this conclusion does not follow from its premise.
Taking judicial notice of the contemporaneous conditions and situations of people, the court points out that mothers generally do
not have the same economic conditions as do fathers and therefore are not equally capable of supporting their child. Furthermore, the court notes that the principal statutory objectives of
this statute are to "secure support of the child and to protect the
public from the burden of supporting a child who has a parent able
to support him."'
The court found the different economic situations between
mothers and fathers to be a sufficient rationale for the statute's
gainful employment, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971);
the right to exercise equal voting rights, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89

(1965); and the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618

(1969).
7. In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 232, 474 P.2d 983, 987, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19
(1970).
8. In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 110-11, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr.
255, 261 (1970), citing Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d
487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 850 (1970).
9. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 8, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1973).
10. Id. The court stated that the law imposed the obligation of support on

both parents and differentiating between mothers as a class and fathers as a class
is a classification "not between men, as such and women, as such; it is between
two classes of human beings both of which have a common obligation."
11. Id.
12. Id. at 9-10, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
13. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 287, 437 P.2d 495, 500, 66 Cal.
See also In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 233, 474 P.2d 983,
Rptr. 7, 12 (1968).

988, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20 (1970).
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classification.' 4 The court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute stating that, "[ilt avails nothing to contend that the facts of
life should be different; that both parents should be equally able
to discharge their parental duty."'
The court acknowledged a state policy that both6 parents are
The court
equally "responsible for support of their children."'
7 to support their child,
"duty"'
a
as
responsibility
this
of
spoke
but failed to find significance in the apparent conflict between
the civil code' 8 which states that both parents have an equal duty
to support their children to the extent of their ability and the
penal code'" which states that the mother's duty is contingent
upon and subsequent to the father's.
The key term in the civil code is duty to "maintain such per2
son to the extent of their ability." 0 To say that the father is
better able to provide support for the child does not necessarily
mean that the mother is not "equally able to discharge [her] par22
ental duty."'" The court, interchanging "duty" for "ability,"
missed this point when it stated that the father desired to "resist
and defeat his duty to support his child unless and until the state
'23 However, this implied cul[proceeded] against the mother.
pability of the father must first be proven at trial before the mother's duty arises under Penal Code section 270. This procedure
necessitates first, the costly trial of one parent and then the other.
Doubtless both must be punished for their neglect of duty, but
what about the child? The purpose of the statute is to provide
for the child and not to punish one parent and then the other.
Here, the court agreed that the primary objective is to proa
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 270(d) (West Supp. 1973) provides that when
fine is imposed in the criminal hearing, the court directs its payment in whole
If the
or in part to the wife of the defendant or to the guardian of the child.

child is receiving public assistance, the court directs the defendant to pay the
county department.
15. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 10, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1973).

16. Id. at 7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 614. The state policy is drawn from CAL.
CIv. CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1973), which states:
It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person
in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such
person to the extent of their ability ....
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 8, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1973).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1973).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1973).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1973).

31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 10, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1973).

22. The court stated in People v. Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 844, 471 P.2d 19,
25, 87 Cal. Rptr. 699, 705 (1970), that a person's ability to pay does not need

to be stated in a complaint because inability to pay would constitute a complete
defense to the charge. This language indicates that ability to pay should be

irrelevant to the charge of criminal nonsupport instead of a rationale behind the
charge.
23. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 8, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1973).
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vide support for the child and protect the public from that burden. Nonetheless, it adhered to the legislative rationale that proceeding initially against the father was the best way of meeting
that objective. In effect, the court's reasoning actually places a
stronger burden on the public because of the possible necessity of
two trials and deprives the child of support that he needs during
this often lengthy procedure. Therefore, both the court and the
legislature have agreed as to what end is to be met but have misconstrued the means for meeting that end.
In Reed v. Reed, the United States Supreme Court stated:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 24
Penal Code section 270 is in reality a method of administrative
convenience in a criminal context. All parties at fault in a criminal matter are equally at fault and the penal code provision is
merely an attempt to eliminate a hearing to determine both the
father's and the mother's respective abilities to support their child.
For the full intention of the legislature to be carried out,
both parents should be joined as defendants in a criminal nonsupport action. In this manner the child may be assured of support; and, the public could be protected from the burden of wardship and care.25
If the state wishes to bring action for criminal nonsupport,
it ought to do so against both parents for if it brings an action
against one spouse and only secondarily against the other, the resultant discrimination based on sex is an invidious denial of equal
protection which bears no rational relationship to the dominant
purpose of the statute; to provide for the child. 28
24. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
25. CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1973) states in
part: "The court,
in determining the ability of the father [or mother]
to support his [or her]
child, shall

consider all income, including social insurance benefits and gifts."
Therefore, with both parents being equally liable, each can contribute
to the
support of the child to the extent of his or her ability. This assures
the child of
support and saves the taxpayers' money in that there is now one
trial instead of
two.
26. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), where the court
a civil action for support, there was no basis for distinguishing held that in
fathers of
illegitimate and legitimate children, and therefore if the state was
to
allow
action
against a father of a legitimate child it must also allow such
action against the
father of an illegitimate child. To do otherwise would be a denial
of equal protection of the law.
Here the father was no less a father because his child was
born out of
wedlock. Is not a parent no less a parent regardless of sex, or
does the duty of
a parent to a child depend upon such a bare fact of life?
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The statute should, therefore, be amended by striking the
procedural distinctions drawn between nonsupport actions brought
against fathers and those brought against mothers. The amendment should require the holding of both parents equally subject
to the provisions of the statute. In this manner, the extent of
each parent's ability to support his or her child could be determined, a judgment coud be based on the resources available for
support of the child, and an equitable determination made resulting in maximum benefits to the child, the public, and the parents.
Richard H. DuBois

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
PROBATIONER BY POLICE OFFICERS PURSUANT TO
CONDITION OF PROBATION CONSTITUTIONAL ONLY
WHEN ACTIVITIES SUGGEST RESUMPTION OF PRIOR
MISCONDUCT OR WHEN LIMITED SEARCH OR FRISK
IS INDEPENDENTLY JUSTIFIABLE-People v. Bremmer,
30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973).
At 6:55 p.m. on November 20, 1971, defendant, Freda
Elaine Bremmer, was driving an automobile. She was stopped by
a police officer for speeding and driving with only one headlight.
The officer requested identification and defendant produced an
apparently valid driver's license. The officer then ran a warrant
check and issued a citation for speeding. The warrant check revealed that defendant was a probationer and that, as a condition
of her probation, she was subject to search and seizure. The officer asked defendant whether she was still subject to search and
received an affirmative reply. He then searched defendant's handbag and found 114 white double-scored tablets. These tablets
were later identified as amphetamine sulphate (benezedrine).
At trial, defendant's motion to suppress the evidence' was
denied and she was convicted of possession of a restricted dangerous drug. 2 On appeal, the defendant challenged the reason1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West 1972). Section 1538.5 provides that a
defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search or
seizure on the grounds that the search or seizure was without a warrant and
was unreasonable.
2. Cal. Stats. (1965), ch. 2030, § 1 (repealed 1972). Former CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11910, was replaced by CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377
(West Supp. 1973) which provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided . . . every person who possesses any
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ableness of the search, contending first, that the detention which
resulted in discovery of the evidence was unlawful, and second,
that the search itself was unreasonable.
The court, in People v. Bremmer,3 rejected defendant's first
argument, and held that the detention was not unlawful and did
not invalidate the seizure of the evidence. 4 As the starting point
for its analysis of this argument, the court noted that a temporary
detention of an individual must satisfy the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution.5 Such detention may violate the
fourth amendment when extended beyond what is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances which justified its initiation.,
When an investigatory detention, initially justified, is found
to violate the fourth amendment, that finding is usually based
upon the unreasonable duration of the detention.' In the instant
case, the detention was found to have lasted only a few minutes.8
The court therefore easily distinguished Willett v. Superior Court9
-where the detention for the warrant check lasted forty minutes
-and People v. Lingo' 0 -where after completing activities relating to motor vehicle equipment and licensing violations, the
officers initiated an inquiry into narcotics possession without reason to do so. Both of these cases invalidated seizures of evidence because the investigatory detention was held to have been
unreasonably prolonged. In support of its holding, the Bremmer
court relied upon People v. Brown," and People v. Elliott, 2 both
holding that if the stopping of a motorist is justified, a short detention for purposes of a warrant check is not unlawful. In
Brown, the detention lasted only five to ten minutes' 3 and in
Elliott, although the period of detention was not specified, it was
4
found to be reasonable.'
controlled substance classified in Schedules III, IV, or V except upon

the prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian
licensed to practice in this state, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the county jail for a period of not more than one year or in the
state prison for a period of not less than 1 year nor more than 10
years . ..
3. 30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973).
4. Id. at 1062, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
5. Id. at 1061-1062, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
6. Willett v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 555, 559, 83 Cal. Rptr. 22,
24 (1969).
7. Pendergraft v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 155
(1971); People v. Lingo, 3 Cal. App. 3d 661, 83 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1970);
Willett v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 555, 83 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1969).
8. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1061, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
9. 2 Cal. App. 3d 555, 83 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1969).
10. 3 Cal. App. 3d 661, 83 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1970).
11. 272 Cal. App. 2d 448, 77 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1969).
12. 186 Cal. App. 2d 185, 8 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1960).
13. 272 Cal. App. 2d at 450, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
14. 186 Cal. App. 2d at 189, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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Thus, the court's holding appears adequately supported by
California law. It may be worthy of note, however, that the
Bremmer court made no reference to any factors or circumstances (and there seem to have been none) existing at the time
of the detention as providing additional justification for the warrant check. This is in distinct contrast to the Brown and Elliott
cases where, without requiring that a particular set of justifying
circumstances exist, the courts clearly indicated that they had considered the circumstances under which the detention occurred in
concluding that the warrant checks were reasonable."5
The courts have generally indicated little desire to impose
6 However,
formal justification requirements on warrant checks.'
performed 17
quickly
and
easily
more
as the warrant check becomes
(and perhaps more easily abused), such requirements may become
necessary. At least one California court has indicated that some
justification requirements should, in fact, be imposed.'"
Although the Bremmer court refused to accept the defendant's contention that the detention was unlawful, it felt compelled to agree with her second argument. It held that the search
was unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and that the evidence thus secured should have
been suppressed.' 9 The court based its conclusion upon the hypothesis that, to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the
fourth amendment, any search of a probationer pursuant to a
general search order 20 must be related to the legitimate objectives
15. In People v. Brown, 272 Cal. App. 2d 448, 77 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1969),
the court noted that defendant was stopped late at night (11:00 p.m.) in a
rural area, and that defendant made a movement down and to his right (consistent with hiding something) while taking an unusually long time to stop.
In People v. Elliott, 186 Cal. App. 2d 185, 8 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1960), the defendant was also stopped late at night (1:15 a.m.) while riding his motorcycle in
the vicinity of Berendo Street and Pico Boulevard in the City of Los Angeles.
The Elliott court stated, somewhat cryptically, that "under the circumstances
presented to the officers," the detention for a reasonable period of time for the
purpose of a warrant check was permissible. Exactly what circumstances justified the warrant check were not stated, but it seems apparent that the court had
considered circumstances other than the fact of the stop itself.
16. People v. Brown, 272 Cal. App. 2d 448, 77 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1969);
People v. Elliott, 186 Cal. App. 2d 185, 8 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1960).
17. According to at least one manufacturer of police communications equipment, reports from local police files may usually be obtained within ten seconds.
Information from state files would be available in twenty seconds, and from the
National Crime Information Center (NC1C) files in Washington D.C. in less
than thirty seconds. AM. CITY, May, 1973, at 63.
18. People v. Grace, 32 Cal. App. 3d 447, 453 n.3, 108 Cal. Rptr. 66, 69
n.3 (1973). Although the point was not directly raised, the court voiced strong
doubts regarding the legality of detentions occasioned by warrant checks in the
absence of specific factors making them reasonable under the circumstances.
19. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1067, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
20. As used here, "general search order" refers to a probation condition
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that probation is designed to accomplish.21
With this hypothesis in mind, the court first considered, in
a general way, searches by the probation officer. It observed
that one purpose of probation is to provide close supervision of
the probationer by the probation officer, whose primary function
is to guide the former's reformation and rehabilitation. The court
concluded that, in the absence of obvious harassment, a warrantless search by, or at the direction of, the probation officer is
for the purpose of guiding the probationer's reformation and rehabilitation. This type
of search is therefore reasonable under
22
the fourth amendment.
The court then examined searches conducted by peace officers. It noted that a police officer's primary concern is enforcing the law, rather than rehabilitating probationers. A policeman should therefore be allowed to exercise the general authority
to search only when there are violations, or seeming violations,
of the law. In the case of a known probationer who is subject
to warrantless search, however, the court determined that "seeming violations" which justify a police officer's exercise of the general authority to search include activities which suggest a resumption of the misconduct which brought about the probation. 28 To
illustrate the level of suspicion that must be aroused by the probationer's conduct, the court gave three examples of fact situations in which an officer would be permitted to exercise the authority of a general search order: (1) a person on probation for
selling narcotics is observed at night on a street comer in a high
crime area, engaging in brief conversations with passersby, (2)
a person on probation for pickpocketing is observed moving slowly and circuitously through a crowded airport, racetrack, or football stadium, and (3) a person on probation for burglary is observed sitting in a parked car in a warehouse district at midnight. 24
Based upon its interpretation of People v. Mason,25 the
Bremmer court delineated yet another situation in which a warrantless search of a probationer pursuant to a general search order
is reasonable. In Mason, the California Supreme Court upheld
a warrantless police search of a probationer's residence and automobile on the ground that, as a condition of his probation, the
probationer was subject to warrantless search and seizure. 26 The
which requires the probationer to submit to a warrantless search whenever he is
requested to do so.
21. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1065, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 801-802.
22. Id. at 1065, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1066, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
25. 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971).
26. Id. at 762, 488 P.2d at 631, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
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probation condition involved in Mason was very similar to that
in Bremmer.1 The Bremmer court observed that in Mason, the
officers had probable cause to arrest the probationer and to perform a limited search incident to that arrest at the time they went
to his home. Although the scope of the Mason search exceeded
that allowable on arrest under Chimel v. California,2" it was upheld based upon the probation condition. 29 Because the Mason
court expressly limited its holding to the facts of that case, 0 the
Bremmer court concluded that Mason applied only to situations
in which an independently justified limited search (incident to
arrest) of a probationer is extended beyond that limited scope
under the authority of a general search order."'
The Bremmer court's interpretation of Mason seems justified
in light of the Mason court's limitation of its own holding.12 How-3
ever, as Justice Roth, in his dissent in Bremmer points out, 3
Mason also contains a great deal of language which appears to
strongly support the application of search and seizure probation
conditions exactly as agreed to by the probationer. This makes
it difficult to determine which interpretation of Mason is correct.
Other courts may be inclined to apply the limitation language in
Mason less strictly than the Bremmer court, and relying on the
statements which support police searches of probationers who
are subject to search and seizure, conclude that there are few if
any limitations upon such searches.
In summary, the test laid down by the Bremmer court consists of three situations in which the search of a probationer pursuant to a general search order is reasonable. These three situations are: (1) a search of a probationer by his probation officer, (2) a search by a peace officer when the probationer's activities suggest a resumption of misconduct, and (3) intensification of a limited search or frisk where such limited search or
frisk is independently justifiable. 4
Obviously, the instant search was not conducted by the defendant's probation officer. Moreover, the court found that
27. In People v. Bremmer, the condition involved required that the probationer "submit his person to search and seizure at any time of day or night by
any law enforcement officer with or without a warrant." 30 Cal. App. 3d at
1062, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 799. In People v. Mason, the condition of probation
required that the probationer "submit to a search, with or without a warrant,
whenever requested by police officers." 5 Cal. 3d at 762, 488 P.2d at 631, 97
Cal. Rptr. at 303.
28. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
29. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1064-65, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
30. 5 Cal. 3d at 762-63, 488 P.2d at 631, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
31. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1066, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 802.

32. 5 Cal. 3d at 762-63, 488 P.2d at 631, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
33. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1068, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 804.

34. See notes 22, 23, and 30 and accompanying text supra.
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there were no facts from which it could be reasonably inferred
that the defendant had lapsed into prior misconduct.35 And finally, the court found that an ordinary traffic offender is not subject to search or frisk, and that no conduct by the defendant occurred at the time of the detention which would otherwise justify
searching or frisking her.36 Because none of the situations described in the court's test existed, the court properly held the
search unreasonable under the fourth amendment."7
The Bremmer court's test clearly appears intended to discourage warrantless police searches of probationers under the
authority of search and seizure probation conditions unless there
are circumstances which generate suspicion of unlawful activity.
Although laudable in its objective, this test is subject to several
criticisms.
First, the question of when-or even whether-the search
of a probationer by his probation officer under the authority of
a general search order is reasonable was not at issue in this case.
That portion of the test is therefore dicta and probably of little
value except to indicate this appellate court's position on that issue.
Second, determining whether a probationer's activities suggest a resumption of prior misconduct presents a very difficult
problem. The illustrations provided by the court indicate that the
activities need arouse only slight suspicion. Therefore, the answer to the question is likely to depend largely upon subtleties and
the particular background of the observing individual. As the
Bremmer dissent indicated, to some the defendant's conduct in
the instant case might suggest a resumption of prior misconduct."8 Although not without a basis in reason, this portion of
the court's test may prove unsatisfactory because of difficulty in
its application.
The third part of the court's test seems more satisfactory.
It provides that the probationer may be searched pursuant to a
general search order whenever, as an ordinary citizen, he would
be subject to a limited warrantless search or frisk.39 This part of
35. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 1066-67, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
36. Id. at 1067, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 803.

37. Id. at 1066-67, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
38. Id. at 1071-72, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 806.

Justice Roth, in his dissent,

contended that driving an automobile at night with but one headlight burning

and at an excessive rate of speed constitutes reckless driving. This reckless
conduct, when combined with knowledge that the driver is on probation for trafficking in dangerous drugs is, according to Justice Roth, sufficient to suggest
that driver may again be engaged in such misconduct. Justice Roth based his
suspicion upon the "common knowledge" that narcotics sellers are frequently
found to be narcotics users, and the known recidivistic tendencies of such users.
39. It should be noted, however, that the search of the probationer will not
be as limited in scope as it would be in the case of an ordinary citizen.
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the test is attractive because it applies a criterion that should be
relatively familiar both to police officers and to the courts. Furthermore, the criterion appears reasonable because whenever a
limited search or frisk of an ordinary citizen is justified, there is
at least some suspicion that he is engaged in unlawful activity.
Tom French

CRIMINAL LAW-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-TITLE III
OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS
ACT OF 1968 DOES NOT PRE-EMPT THE CALIFORNIA
INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT-People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App.
3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1973); People v. Conklin, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 914, 107 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1973).
The question of federal pre-emption in the area of wiretapping and electronic surveillance resulting from the passage of
Title IlI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
19681 is at issue in two recent California appellate cases.2 These
decisions both involved wiretapping violations prohibited by the
California Invasion of Privacy Act.' Both courts concluded that
the federal statute did not pre-empt the state statute.
The appellate courts' respective rationales, similar in most
aspects, differ, however, in their utilization of Halpin v. Superior Court,4 a California Supreme Court decision purportedly holding that Title III of the federal law had, in some areas, occupied
the field of wiretapping to the exclusion of corresponding state
legislation. The court in People v. Jones" cites Halpin6 as authority for the proposition that Congress intended to allow concurrent state legislation with certain restrictions. In People v. Conk1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title III].
2. People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1973), hearing
denied, April 25, 1973, hearing granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3073 (U.S. August 7,
1973); People v. Conklin, 31 Cal. App. 3d 914, 107 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1973),
hearing granted, July 6, 1973.

3.

CAL. PEN. CODE

§§ 630-37.2 (West 1970).

Halpin
4. 6 Cal. 3d 885, 495 P.2d 1295, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1972).
involved the admissibility of evidence obtained by wiretap while Halpin was in
county jail. The court held the evidence was inadmissible under both California
and federal wiretapping provisions, but ostensibly decided that the provisions of
Title III pre-empted those of the Invasion of Privacy Act.
5. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
6. 6 Cal. 3d at 898-99, 495 P.2d at 1305, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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the court attempts to distinguish Halpin and limit the breadth
of its holding. It would appear, therefore, that the status of the
California statute is still uncertain in regard to the question of
federal pre-emption, pending further clarification by a higher
court. s

In Jones the defendant was indicted for conspiracy to commit bookmaking. The indictment was based on evidence obtained through a wiretap of defendant's telephone by federal agents
lawfully authorized by the United States District Court pursuant
to provisions of Title III.9 The lower court suppressed the wiretap evidence as inadmissible under Penal Code section 631, the
California Invasion of Privacy Act.1 ° The Court of Appeal, in
affirming the order, held that no conflict existed between the state
and federal statutes.
First, the court noted that the measure of privacy afforded
an individual is increased by California's wiretapping provisions
beyond the protection guaranteed by Title M. Second, the authority of federal officers to obtain information under the federal
law is not decreased or diluted by California's refusal to accept
this information as evidence in state court proceedings."
The underlying rationale of Jones is grounded on that court's
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.' 2
The court reasons that a federal statute pre-empts related state legislation only if there is a conflict between the statutes or if the
relevant state provisions are more permissive than the provisions
of the federal law. Jones cites Halpin v. Superior Court' as
authority for reasoning that Congress, in enacting Title III, intended to allow the states to supplement the law insofar as particular state legislation complied with or reinforced the federal guidelines established by Title III. In another reference to Halpin, the
Jones court states that the purpose of Title III is not curtailment
7. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 916-17, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73.
8. Partial clarification of this matter may be forthcoming as a result of the
subsequent history of Jones and Conklin. The California Supreme Court has
granted a hearing on Conklin, and the United States Supreme Court has granted

a hearing on Jones. It is also noteworthy that the decision rendered in Conklin
has been vacated by the fact that the California Supreme Court granted a hearing.
Because of this, the decision itself has no precedential value except to the extent
that it is used as a brief or supporting argument at the hearing before the California Supreme Court. Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 483, 66 P.2d 438,
439 (1937).
9. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 tit. I1, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(7) (1970).
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 631 (West 1970)..
11. People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751
(1973).
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13.

6 Cal. 3d at 899, 495 P.2d at 1305, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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of existing state legislation, but rather protection of the right of
privacy.14
The court contrasts the relevant sections of the state15 and
federal16 statutes in reaching its decision on pre-emption. Penal
Code section 63117 states that any intentional or unauthorized
connection with telephone wires is illegal and, further, that evidence so obtained is inadmissible in a judicial proceeding. "Unauthorized", as defined in People v. Treiber,'8 means without the
consent of the subscriber to the telephone and the consent of the
telephone company.
Title III establishes a uniform procedure for obtaining federal court authorization allowing federal officers to tap telephones.
Court authorization procedures do not have to precede a tap in
certain exigent circumstances. Under the federal provisions, an
interception is illegal only if an intent to intercept is present. Consent of one of the parties to a conversation renders a tap lawful
unless the interception is for an illicit purpose.
The Jones court reasons' 9 that as one stated purpose of the
federal law is to effectuate the protection of privacy,20 the California statute in no way conflicts with that purpose. Rather, the
measure of protection is increased under the California statute
since intent to intercept is not a requisite for violation, nor is consent of one of the parties alone sufficient to make a tap legal.
An additional assurance of privacy in the California statute is the
absence of court ordered wiretaps. A tap is only authorized if
the subscriber and the telephone company consent. There is,
therefore, no chance that a judge could be misled into giving permission for an essentially illegal tap.
The other stated purpose of Title Il--the deliniation of uniform procedures21-is also not obstructed by the Jones decision
because, while the California statute would preclude the admission
of evidence obtained under the standards of Title III in a state
action, it would not interfere with or obstruct the ability of federal officers to obtain evidence and utilize it in a federal proceed14. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 751.

15. California Invasion of Privacy Act,

CAL. PEN. CODE

§ 631 (West 1970).

16. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. I, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1970).
17. California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PEN. CODE § 631 (West 1970).
18. 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946). Treiber established the definition
of "unauthorized" in conjunction with Penal Code section 640, which was replaced by Penal Code section 631. Jones states that the definition from Treiber
is still applicable to Penal Code section 631.
19. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
20. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801 (1968).
21. Id.
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ing. According to Jones, this procedural differentiation does not
contravene federal pre-emption principles.
People v. Conklin22 involved a defendant who had placed an
unauthorized wiretapping device on an internal communication
system at his place of employment. The defendant demurred to
the charge of wiretapping under California law on the ground that
the enactment of Title III pre-empted the corresponding state legislation. The superior court, relying on Halpin, sustained the demurrer. The court of appeal reversed the judgment holding that
Congress, through Title III, had not pre-empted state legislation
punishing unauthorized connections with telephone wires.2 3
The basis for the holding in Conklin is also essentially
grounded on the Supremacy Clause.24 Rather than relying on
Halpin to support its conclusion, however, the Conklin court observed that Halpin did not hold that federal pre-emption applied,
or at least, did not hold that federal pre-emption was all inclusive. 25
The court in Conklin states that the conclusion in Halpin
relating to federal pre-emption is dictum unsupported by the
rationale of the opinion. 26 The Conklin court notes that the
Halpin decision was limited to a discussion of the constitutionality
of Title III based upon tenth amendment grounds. Thus, Conklin reasons that any statements in Halpin relating to or discussing pre-emption were merely responsive to the petitioner's argument and were unrelated to the primary thrust of the decision.2 7
In its attempt to limit Halpin, the Conklin court highlights
several references in Halpin which it feels are indicative that preemption was not the intended holding of that case. For instance,
the Conklin court noted that Halpin intimates that Congressional
intent left room for state additions provided they were at least
as stringent as federal provisions. 2 Halpin also left open the
question of whether Title III or the Senate Report accompanying
it directed the federal government to regulate areas of wiretapping ". . . solely within the legislative domain of the state
"29

The court in Conklin further argues that federal pre-emp22. 31 Cal. App. 3d 914, 107 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1973).
23.

Id.

24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
25. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
26. Id.

27. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 916,
28. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 917,
perior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 885, 899,
(1972).
29. 6 Cal. 3d at 899, 495 P.2d

107 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
107 Cal. Rptr. at 773, citing Halpin v. Su495 P.2d 1295, 1305, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 385
at 1305, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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tion, even if assumed, is not all inclusive. Halpin's reference to
"particular fields" of wiretapping which were pre-empted by Title
III3 is found by Conklin to be ambiguous and naturally leads to
a conclusion that state supplementation outside these fields is permissible. In support of this contention, the court calls attention
to the portion of the Halpin decision which refers to several areas
in which Congress specifically did not intend to pre-empt state
legislation. 3"
As additional support for its conclusion that Title III does
not invalidate the Invasion of Privacy Act, Conklin cites decisions
of the United States Supreme Court discussing pre-emption. In
particular, the Court in Perez v. Campbell32 reasons that a state
regulatory statute is pre-empted by federal legislation under the
Supremacy Clause only if it obstructs or undermines the total
objective of Congress when it enacted the particular legislation.33
These pre-emption principles are utilized by the Conklin court to
analyze the interplay between the Invasion of Privacy Act 34 and

Title III.
As in Jones, whether Congress intended, by its authority
through the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, to occupy the
field of wiretapping regulation by comprehensive national legislation or whether it intended Title III to represent the minimum
standards that would be constitutionally acceptable for the states
to utilize is still the basic issue. Several references are made in
Jones and Conklin to the Senate Report on Title III.1 5 These
same references were also cited in Halpin.3 6 The frequent citation to references from the Senate Report in these three decisions
lead to the conclusion that Congressional intent is less than completely clear and is open to interpretation.
The statement of purpose in the Senate Report-the pro37
tection of privacy and the establishment of uniform procedures _
is followed by reference to the Supreme Court's opinion in Berger v. New York.3 8 In Berger the Court declared unconstitutional
30. Id. The particular fields were not enumerated.
31. Id. These areas are identified as the degree of disclosure and scope of
knowledge required to violate section 2511, provisions of section 2512 banning
various use or manufacturing aspects of interception devices, and the rules in
section 2516 governing the authorization of intercepting communications.
32. 402 U.S. 637 (1970).
33. Id. at 649.
34. California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PEN. CoDE §§ 630-37.2 (West

1970).
35. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reported in 2 U.S.
Code Cong. and Admin. News 2153 (1968).

36. 6 Cal. 3d at 898-99, 495 P.2d at 1305, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
37. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reported in 2 U.S. Code
Cong. and Admin. News 2153 (1968).

38. Id. at 2156; see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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a New York wiretapping statute and established a constitutional
framework within which Congress and state legislatures could work
to enact or reform wiretapping and electronic surveillance statutes.
Title III emerged from this framework. The Senate Report also
alludes to the lack of uniformity and general ineffectiveness of
state statutes, highlighting the necessity for the establishment of
uniform
standards to ensure fair, comprehensive and viable re89
form.

The repeated references in the Senate Report to "standards"
can be seen to imply a goal for corresponding state legislation.
Arguably, state legislative action in this area does not appear to be
substantively precluded if the rationale of Berger, that the established guidelines be applicable to the states as well as Congress, is
heeded. It can be argued that the establishment of uniform procedures need not imply a verbatim adoption of the federal
scheme by a state, if state procedures implement and enhance the
substance of the federal law.
One commentator 4" has indicated support for this argument
and for the conclusions of the courts in Jones and Conklin. He
states that Title III establishes explicit standards in the area of
wiretapping by virtue of the Supremacy Clause which state legislatures must now meet. The author concludes that the states
may adopt more restrictive controls, or none at all, 41 but they can
not enact more permissive regulations.
Keeping in mind the United States Supreme Court's standard
for application of federal pre-emption as presented in Perez,42 it
appears that Jones and Conklin are judicially sound in holding
that pre-emption has not occurred. The pertinent provisions of the
Invasion of Privacy Act4" do not appear to frustrate or subvert
Congressional intent as articulated in the Senate Report. If anything, the measure of protection afforded privacy in California
goes beyond the standards established by Congress. The California provisions, as the Jones decision points out, do not preclude
federal officers from gathering information in a manner not sanctioned by California law, but only precludes the utilization of
that information in state criminal proceedings.44 The procedures
39. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reported in 2 U.S.
Code Cong. and Admin. News 2156 (1968).
40. Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legislative Control, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1182, 1199-1200 (1969).
41. Id. at 1200. The author obviously means that the states will be governed by the federal statute if they adopt no controls at all.
42. 402 U.S. 637 (1970).
43. California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PEN. CoDE §§ 630-37.2 (West
1970).
44. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
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set forth in Title III can still operate in a state action to the extent
that they are as restrictive as California's, and they can certainly
operate fully in any federal action involving wiretapping.
Augusta Giffen

ELECTIONS-LIMITATIONS ON FRANCHISE-DENIAL
OF VOTE TO CONVICTED EX-FELONS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR TERM AND PAROLE HELD VIOLATIVE
OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-Ramirez v. Brown, 9
Cal. 3d 199, 507 P.2d 1345, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1973).
In 1952 petitioner Ramirez was convicted in Texas of a felony, robbery by assault. After serving a three month jail term
he was placed on parole, which he completed in 1962. In February, 1972, Ramirez applied for voter registration in San Luis
Obispo County. The county clerk refused his application on the
grounds that Ramirez had been convicted of and served time for
a felony.
Petitioners' invoked the original jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court' and sought relief by writ of mandate. The
court issued an alternative writ of mandate directing that respondents "'register to vote all ex-felons whose term(s) of incarceration and parole have expired and who upon application demonstrate that they are otherwise fully qualified to vote,' or show
cause why this should not be done."' 3 The clerks of San Luis
Obispo, Monterey, and Stanislaus Counties did not contest the issue and advised the court that they would thereafter register all
such ex-felons who applied, including the petitioners.
Since acquiescence by these three counties did not bind the
election officials of the other fifty-five counties in California in
which a large number of similarly situated ex-felons reside, the
1. Two other ex-felons, denied voter registration in Monterey and Stanislaus counties, joined petitioner Ramirez in this action. Ramirez v. Brown, 9
Cal. 3d 199, 202, 507 P.2d 1345, 1346, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 138 (1973).
2. The original jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court (CAL. CONST.
art. 6, § 10; CAL. RULFS OF COURT 56(a) (West 1973) ) is exercised only in
cases in which the issues presented are of great public importance and must
be resolved promptly. Cases involving voting rights and elections have been
held to satisfy these requirements. See Jolicoer v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,
570 nn. 1, 2, 488 P.2d 1, 3 nn. 1, 2, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699 nn. 1, 2 (1971).
3. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 203, 507 P.2d 1345, 1347, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 139 (1973).
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court, speaking unanimously through Justice Mosk, ruled that the
case was not moot and proceeded to decide it on the merits.
The court held that, as applied to all ex-felons whose terms
of incarceration and parole have expired, the provisions of the
California Constitution and Elections Code' denying the right of
suffrage to persons convicted of crime violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court expressly
declined to decide the constitutionality of provisions denying
the vote to felons currently incarcerated or on parole. The alternative writ, having served its purpose, was discharged and the
petition for a peremptory writ was denied.5
Respondents relied upon California statutory and constitutional provisions in refusing to register petitioners to vote. The
constitutionality of similar provisions had previously been examined in Otsuka v. Hite.6 In Otsuka, the court held that restrictions on voting rights of ex-felons could be upheld under the thencurrent equal protection test: where a fundamental right is involved, there must be a compelling state interest served by the
restriction, and that restriction must draw only those classifications which are reasonable in light of its purpose. 7 The compelling state interest identified in Otsuka was that of protecting the
purity of the ballot box against election fraud by former criminals. The Otsuka court held that "the inquiry must focus more
precisely on the nature of the crime itself, and determine whether the
elements of the crime are such that he who has committed it may
reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to the integrity of the
elective process."'
The court in Otsuka found no such threat
where the plaintiffs had been convicted twenty years earlier for
refusing to serve in the armed forces because of conscientious objection.' No case subsequent to Otsuka has construed the vague
test enunciated in that case.
The Ramirez court found that since the decision in Otsuka
the safeguards of the equal protection clause had been expanded
in cases involving fundamental rights. It was now not enough
that the classification bear a reasonable relationship to a compelling state interest; the restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right by some group must be necessary to protect an artic4. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 3; art. 20, § 11; CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 310,
321, 383, 389, 390, 14240, 14246 (West 1961).
5. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 217, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 149 (1973).
6. 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
7. Id. at 603, 414 P.2d at 417, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 289. See also McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
8. 64 Cal. 2d 596, 605, 414 P.2d 412, 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966).
9. Id.
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ulated state concern. This test was first enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Kramer v. Union School District,'0 which
invalidated a New York statute denying the vote in school district
elections to persons who neither owned nor leased property within
the district nor were parents of children in local schools. Such
classifications were held not necessary to protect or further a
compelling state interest."
Since Kramer, the Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of "necessary" by holding that a classification which restricts the exercise of a fundamental right must be the least burdensome means available for achieving the articulated state interest.
In Bullock v. Carter12 the United States Supreme Court held
that filing fee requirements for Texas primary elections were invalid because they were not the "least burdensome" means of protecting the political process from frivolous and fraudulent candidacies.' 3 Shortly after Bullock, the Court decided Dunn v.
Blumstein,"4 in which it struck down Tennessee's durational residence requirements for voting in state and county elections. The
state interest, prevention of election fraud by non-residents falsely
swearing they are eligible to vote, compelling as it was, could have
been promoted through use of voter registration procedures and
by the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. Thus the Court concluded that the durational residency requirements should be struck
down as more burdensome than other means available for protection of the state interest.' 5
Armed with these developments in the law of equal protection, the California court had little difficulty finding that laws restricting voting rights of ex-felons were not necessary to protect
the compelling state interest in issue. The articulated state interest in Ramirez, as in Otsuka, was the protection of the ballot box
against abuses by the morally corrupt.' 6
After noting that several California cases had recognized
the abovementioned equal protection developments and had incorporated their strict standards into California law, the court
considered whether or not the "total statutory scheme for regulating the franchise"' 17 affords a less burdensome means of prevent10.

395 U.S. 621 (1969).

11. Id. at 632.
12.

405 U.S. 134 (1972).

13. Id. at 145-146.
14. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
15. Id. at 343, 353-54.
16. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 211-12, 507 P.2d 1345, 1353,
Cal. Rptr. 137, 145 (1973).

17. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 346 (1972).
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ing election fraud than the denial of the franchise to ex-felons.' I
The court found some support, in the rudimentary California election statutes of the nineteenth century, for the proposition
that disenfranchisement of ex-felons was necessary to deter election fraud. At that time registration was not required, official
ballots were not supplied, and secret voting was difficult."9 Today, of course, striking changes have occurred in the election laws,
resulting in a complex reticulation of controls regulating the voting and counting processes.20 In addition the court found that
the penal sanctions for election fraud have grown dramatically.
The first statutes provided for only eight offenses, all misdemeanors. 21 Today the Election Code provides for the punishment of
at least seventy-six election-related acts as felonies, sixty as misdemeanors, and fourteen as felony-misdemeanors. 22
The California Supreme Court thus found adequate protection, both in procedural safeguards and in the deterrent effect
of criminal sanctions, to render disenfranchisement of ex-felons
who have completed both their prison term and parole unnecessary
to prevent election fraud and thus in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 23 Ramirez is a reasonable application of the Supreme Court's current equal protection standard as articulated in Dunn; there is ample support for
Justice Mosk's finding that the classification challenged was not
the least burdensome means of deterring election fraud by exfelons. Indeed, there is reason to believe that disenfranchisement
is not effective as a deterrent to election fraud. For example,
statutory voting rights are not necessary in order to commit many
election crimes, such as bribing election officials, voting under an
assumed name, or threatening voters.
There is nothing in the Dunn, Bullock, or Kramer decisions
which would limit to their facts the application of the standard
of review they enunciate. Nevertheless the United States Supreme Court recently agreed to hear an appeal of Ramirez.2" The
18. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 212, 507 P.2d 1345, 1353,
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Cal. Rptr. 137, 145 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Kirk v. Rhoads, 46 Cal. 398, 406 (1873); Cal. Stats. (1850),
ch. 38, §§ 12, 24, 25, 27-31, 33-36; Petersen, The Struggle for the Australian
Ballot in California,51 CAL. HIST. Q. 227-28 (1972).
20. That these controls are effective can be inferred from the fact that the
Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters had received no complaints of deliberate voting irregularities in the forty-one years previous to 1967. See
Note, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 699, 702 (1967).
21. Cal. Stats. (1850), ch. 38, §§ 98-105.
22. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 215, 507 P.2d 1345, 1355, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 147 (1973).
23. Id. at 217, 507 P.2d at 1357, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
24. Richardson v. Ramirez, 42 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1973). Ap-

pellant, county clerk of Mendocino County, urges that section 2 of the four-
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Court, by adhering to its own precedents and approving the deci-

sion in Ramiiez, can aid efforts to better assimilate into society rehabilitated felons. If the high Court reverses the California Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez, it would rebuff these rehabilitative endeavors and sanction one of the badges which currently
designate ex-felons as social outcasts.
Randolph M. Paul

AIRPORT SEARCH AND SEIZURE-HAS THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BECOME EXCESS BAGGAGE FOR TRAVELLERS?-United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
On January 21, 1972, Deputy U.S. Marshal Granados, a

member of the San Antonio International Airport's anti-piracy'
squad and a law enforcement officer of twenty years, observed
Abraham Pina Moreno deplane from a Braniff jet and leave the

airport, only to return approximately two hours later. After observing Moreno purchase an airline ticket from Southwest Airlines, and suspecting that a bulge in the suspect's coat pocket
might be a weapon to be used in a hijacking scheme, Granados
in the men's restroom of the airport to get a
approached ' Moreno
2

"closer look

at the bulge. The marshal asked Moreno for identi-

teenth amendment impliedly sanctions denial of the franchise to ex-felons.
(Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment allows states to include, for purposes
of determining legislative representation, those "Indians not taxed . . ." and citizens whose voting rights have been abridged "for participation in rebellion, or
other crime ....") This issue was not discussed by the California Supreme
Court in Ramirez, although it was raised by the respondent in the pleadings.
Personal interview with Phillip J. Jiminez, attorney for petitioner ABRAN RAMmEZ,
October 1, 1973.
1. Air piracy is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(2) (1970) as
[A]ny seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of
force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft within the
special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.
To counter the threat to the traveling public and to the airlines, a Federal
Aviation Administration Task Force was appointed in October, 1968, to discover
ways of reducing the number of air piracies. United States v. Lopez, 328 F.
Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). As a result of the joint efforts of the Task
Force and the airlines, an anti-hijacking system was established and was made
operational in many public air terminals in the United States. This program was
extended to all "appropriate" airports in the United States by Presidential order
of September 11, 1970. United States v. Anderson, 12 Cr. Law Rep. 2395, 2395
(9th Cir. June 29, 1973).
For further explanation of the anti-piracy system, see note 26 infra.
2. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ficiation which Moreno hesitatingly furnished.
Fearing that
the suspect might flee, Granados called for assistance and, with
the summoned officer, escorted Moreno to the security office.
After frisking Moreno, they asked him what was in his pocket;
although he pulled out some papers, the bulge remained. The
marshals ordered him to remove his coat which they then searched.
That search revealed three cellophane wrapped packages contain-

ing 86.6 grams of heroin.
Mr. Moreno was charged in federal district court with violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841 (a) (1),1 the unlawful possession
of heroin with intent to distribute. Although he filed a motion
to suppress the seized heroin, the motion was denied by the fed-

eral district court on the grounds that not only was the detention

and search permissible, but there was sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intent to distribute

the heroin. Moreno appealed the denial of the motion to suppress
to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The primary issue in the case before the Court of Appeals
was whether the airport search of Moreno and the seizure of the
heroin found on his person were constitutional under the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. The court held
that since the heroin was the product of a lawful search, and there
was sufficient evidence to establish the intent to distribute, the
trial court made no error in denying Moreno's motion to suppress. 4 Consequently, Moreno's conviction was affirmed.
The Court of Appeals based its holding on Terry v. Ohio5
and later decisions interpreting that case in the context of airport
search and seizures. 6 In Terry, the United States Supreme Court
3. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) provides in part:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally-( I) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
a controlled substance ....
21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1970) defines a controlled substance as:
[a] drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in
schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter ....
Heroin is listed in schedule I(b). 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1970).
4. 475 F.2d at 52.
5. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6. While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically decided the
constitutionality of an airport search and seizure, six Circuit Courts of Appeals,
as well as numerous federal district courts and state courts, including those of
California, have declared them to be constitutional. The federal cases which the
Moreno court cites in support of its holding are: United States v. Bell, 335 F.
Supp. 797 (2d Cir. 1971) (frisk of defendant, occurring after he has matched
profile and triggered magnetometer, revealed two hard bulges in his pocket
which were feared to be weapons; subsequent search of defendant for weapons
was held to be valid, and narcotics found during search were admissible);
United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
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determined that the constitutionality of a search and seizure 7 depended upon whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate."' Applying the test established in Terry, the Moreno court determined
the instant search and seizure to be reasonable. Moreno's behavior-including his switching lines several times at the Braniff
ticket counter before purchasing a Southwest ticket, protecting
the bulge in his pocket, and lying to Granados when he was inititially questioned regarding his arrival time in San Antonio and his
destination while in that city 9-was found to be similar to the behavior pattern of known hijackers; therefore, the court considered
Granados' actions reasonable under the Terry rationale. 10
In concluding its opinion, the court attempted to further
justify its position by comparing the airport and air piracy problems to the border crossing situation where "mere suspicion" is a
sufficient basis for conducting a search." Apparently the court's
995 (1972) (defendant's conviction for heroin possession resulting from the evidence obtained by a frisk and then a search was upheld by applying Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to the facts of the case, including the defendant's
use of different names, his extremely nervous behavior, and a very hard bulge in
his coat pocket); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3rd Cir. 1972) (defendant, by meeting profile criteria, activating the magnetometer, and failing to
produce identification for the U.S. marshal, was frisked, but no weapons were
found; a subsequent search of his luggage revealed a sock containing cocaine.
His conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) was unbeld); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d
769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972) (the Moreno court also relied
on a case outside the narcotics area: the Epperson court held that the search of
the defendant which revealed a pistol was reasonable and hence legal because he
activated the magnetometer in the process of boarding a plane. Therefore, his
conviction of attempting to board an airplane while carrying a concealed dangerous weapon was upheld.).
7. This note uses the terms "stop and frisk" and "search and seizure"
interchangeably and without distinction because,
[w]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. And it is nothing
less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or
her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.'
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
8. 392 U.S. at 21-22, comparing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-7 (1964).
9. Moreno told Granados that he had arrived in San Antonio the day
before and was unhappy with the taxi fare to the airport from Baptist Memorial
Hospital where he had allegedly stayed since his arrival in the city. However,
Granados knew, from personal observation, that Moreno had arrived in San
Antonio a few hours before, and had gone to the bus station, not to the hospital.
(Granados obtained the latter information from the taxi cab dispatcher.)
10. 475 F.2d at 50. The court also took notice that the hijacker "[in some
cases . . . is a deeply disturbed and highly unpredictable individual-a paranoid,
suicidal schizophrenic with extreme tendencies towards violence." 475 F.2d at 48.
11. United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 832 (5th Cir. 1971), cited by the
Moreno court. 475 F.2d at 51 n.8.
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reasoning in making the comparison was logistical: just as one
must pass through the border zone to enter the United States, so
too must one pass through an airport to hijack a plane.' 2 Nevertheless, the court made it clear that the actual basis of its opinion
was the Terry rationale and not its analogy to border searches.'"
In declaring the search of Moreno to be lawful, the court

extended the rationale of Terry and thereby made its stop and
frisk doctrine virtually meaningless.

Rather than limit the scope

of an officer's search of a suspect in an airport to a pat-down of
the outer clothing of the suspect, 4 the Moreno court declared
that such a restriction in the final analysis would be self-defeating:
hijackers may hide weapons in places that may be overlooked in a

pat-down search.' 5 Therefore, by implication, any search would
appear to pass constitutional muster as long as "there is a proper
basis for an air piracy investigation."' 16

To determine whether there was a "proper basis" for Moreno's search and seizure, it is appropriate to use the three basic

Terry criteria in our analysis. Those criteria are:
1. The governmental interest justifying the need to search;
and
2. The specific, articulable facts reasonably warranting the
intrusion; and
3. The extent of invasion the search entails.' 7
12. 475 F.2d at 51.
13. Id. at 51 n.8.
14. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Epperson,
454 F.2d 769 (1972):
When the high metal indication of the magnetometer was not satisfactorily explained by Epperson ... the marshal . . .was entitled, for
[the protection of the passengers] to conduct a carefully limited search
of the clothing of Epperson in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used for air piracy.
Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
For cases in which the officer limited the scope of his search of the suspect's
person to a pat-down of that individual's outer clothing see United States v.
Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 703 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v. Rivera, 13 Cr.
Law Rep. 2234, 2235 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 1973); United States v. Mitchell,
352 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
15. 475 F.2d at 51.
16. Id. That the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals itself realized the implications of its decision in Moreno was demonstrated by its subsequent decision in
United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973):
In U.S. v. Moreno, this court recognized that the public danger
posed by air piracy has transformed the airport into a 'critical zone
where special fourth amendment considerations apply.' Though the
Terry and Adams decisions were followed in that case, the court rejected the view that 'airport security officers must always confine
themselves to a 'pat down' search where there is a proper basis for an
air piracy investigation.'
Id. at 410-11 (citations and footnotes omitted).
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-4 (1968).
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As will be demonstrated in the remainder of this note, not only
was a proper basis for the investigation conducted by Deputy
Marshal Granados lacking, but the extent of interference with
Moreno's person was not justified by the facts of the case.
Many courts, in deciding airport search and seizure cases,
have urged that the governmental interest justifying such searches
is the protection of the lives of passengers and crew members as
well as the protection of airline property.' 8 Due to the danger inherent in hijackings, many courts have argued that one's expectations of privacy should not be the same in an airport terminal
as on a street. 9 The Moreno court appears to follow such an
argument. In emphasizing the danger of hijackings to air carriers,
passengers, and crew, the implication is clear that the Moreno
court believes a law enforcement official is permitted to go beyond a simple frisk when searching a suspected hijacker. That
this is an inference fairly drawn from the court's holding is demonstrated by the court's comments that "[t]he hijacker can conceal explosives or weapons in places which might be overlooked
in the course of a cursory pat down."2
However, the federal district court in United States v. Meulener" held that by not informing the suspect at the time of the
search that he had the option to refuse being searched if he did
not board the plane, the interrogating officers violated his fourth
amendment rights. 2 Moreno was not given such an option either
at the time of the restroom encounter nor, more importantly, in
the security office when he was searched. Had he been given
the option and chosen not to board the Southwest flight, the governmental interest of protecting air carriers, their crews and passengers from the danger of hijackings would have been eliminated

at least in regard to Moreno. Thus, a search of him would not
have been necessary.23
18. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v.
Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F.

Supp. 1077, 1095 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); People v. Lacey, 30 Cal. App. 3d 170, 176,
105 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1973).
19. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972); People v.
Lacey, 30 Cal. App. 3d 170, 176, 105 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1973); People v. Botos,

27 Cal. App. 3d 774, 778, 104 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1972).
20. 475 F.2d at 51 (emphasis added).

21. 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
22. Id. at 1286. Other cases have similarly held that those who are
stopped at the boarding area have the option of either being searched before

being permitted to board or, if they are not willing to be searched, not being
allowed to board. See United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
23. Although the search in United States v. Anderson was based upon an
administrative search following F.A.A. regulations and not upon a Terry stop
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Furthermore, the governmental interest in preventing hijackings is obviously strongest in the boarding area, for that area is
the airline's "last chance" to detect hijackers before the actual
boarding takes place. Yet, as one moves away from the boarding
area (and the airplane) and back into the terminal, the danger of
that person committing a hijacking lessens and, correspondingly,
so should the government's interest in observing that individual.
Yet, Moreno was initially stopped, not in the passenger boarding
area, but in the men's restroom located in the terminal. If such
a confrontation is constitutional in this situation, where is the line
to be drawn in the future? Does this decision mean that when
someone buys a ticket and, according to the subjective opinion of
an air marshal, is acting strangely, he is subject to search anywhere
in the terminal? Or does the right to search on the basis of preventing a possible hijacking extend further back to the time, for
example, when one initially enters the air terminal?
That this discussion is more than mere speculation was demonstrated by a second decision 24 of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which upheld an airport search of defendant's shopping bag,
feared to contain a bomb, but actually containing heroin. In that
case, defendant's companion, shopping bag in hand, left the terminal and walked across the street; at that point, he was stopped by
an airline security agent who had followed him from the terminal
and who, after taking the bag, escorted the companion back to an
airline office. The court decided that such action by the security
agent was proper "[g]iven the current threat to public safety
posed by air piracy as well as the inherent destruction potential
,,.5 Clearly the governmental interest justifying
of a bomb .
the need to search both Moreno and Legato's companion was inadequate.
and frisk (in Anderson there was an indiscriminate screening of boarding
passengers), an observation made by the Anderson court appears applicable to
the Moreno situation: "The risk of successful hijacking is not enhanced by
allowing a potential passenger to avoid a search on a particular occasion by
electing not to fly ...... United States v. Anderson, 13 Cr. Law Rep. 2395,
2396 (9th Cir. June 29, 1973).
24. United States v. Legato, 13 Cr. Law Rep. 2303 (5th Cir. June 14, 1973)
in which the same court which decided Moreno upheld the search of defendant's
shopping bag on the basis of an anonymous phone tip.
25. Id. at 2304. It is little wonder that Justice Goldberg, in his concurring
opinion in Legato noted:
It is passing strange [sic] that most of these airport searches find narcotics and not bombs, which might cause us to pause in our rush toward
malleating the Fourth Amendment in order to keep the bombs from
exploding. Seeking to prevent or detect crime, standing alone, has
never justified eroding the right to privacy, and I continue to hope that
we will soon return to the hallowed and halcyon days of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 2304.
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Turning to the second of the three Terry criteria-that spec-

ific facts must exist to reasonably warrant the intrusion-it must
be noted at the outset that one may be stopped and frisked in an

airport confrontation either on the basis of a Terry stop and frisk
or according to the procedures established by the Federal Avia-

tion Administration's anti-piracy system. 26 However, in the Mor26. As explained in the leading anti-piracy case of United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) the Federal Anti-Hijacking System
provides in part:
"1. Heavy Penalties.
A severe statute with possible death penalties for hijacking was
There already were in
adopted. [See 49 U.S.C. 1472(i) (1970)].
force various regulations and statutes prohibiting the carrying on board
of firearms and other weapons.
2. Notice to the Public.
Signs in English and Spanish are posted at the boarding gates
where passengers' tickets are checked reading as follows:
.AIRCRAFT HIJACKING IS A FEDERAL
CRIME PUNISHABLE BY DEATH
CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS
ABOARD AIRCRAFT IS PUNISHABLE
BY PRISON SENTENCES & FINES
PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE
SUBJECT TO SEARCH
These signs are eleven by fourteen inches with half inch high
letters. Warnings of the same or larger dimensions are conspicuously
posted at other parts of the air terminal . . . [These signs] serve to
deter and to reduce the possibility of embarrassment should a passenger's boarding progress be interrupted.
3. Profile.
If a passenger meets a prescribed 'profile,' he is focused on by airline employees. . . . [The exact criteria of the profile are not, for
obvious reasons, released to the public. If the profile becomes part of
the discussion in court, that part of the proceeding is held in camera
and the defendant is excluded from the courtroom. However, as the
Lopez court notes, the Task Force which compiled the profile did not
base it on "religion, origin, political views, or race. . . . After studying known hijackers, the Task Force compiled twenty-five to thirty
characteristics in which hijackers differed significantly from the airtraveling public." United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086,
(E.D.N.Y. 1971)].
4. Magnetometer.
A magnetometer is installed in the passageway leading to the plane
so that all passengers must pass through it. It is set to flash a warning
light when metal equal to or greater than an average 25 caliber gun in
magnetic force deflecting power is carried by.
5. Interview by Airlines Personnel.
A person who triggers the magnetometer and meets the profile
requirements is 'interviewed' by airlines personnel. If he provides satisfactory identification, he is permitted to proceed unimpeded. Otherwise, he is designated a 'selectee' and is denied boarding until a Deputy
U.S. Marshal is summoned.
6. Interview by Marshal.
The Marshal again requests identification of those designated as
'selectees.' If satisfactory identification is not furnished, it is suggested
that the person go through the magnetometer once more. Before walking through he is asked if he has any metal on his person or in any
baggage he is carrying. If he replies in the negative and still sets off
the magnetometer, a request is made that he submit to a 'voluntary'
search. It is explained that this search is part of an attempt by the
government to prevent hijackings.
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eno case, although Granados was a member of the anti-piracy
force, no mention was made that the system's detection procedures (profile, magnetometer) were used. Consequently, if the
search of Moreno by Granados is to be upheld, it must be justified on the basis of the Terry criteria.
Granados based his opinion that Moreno was nervous first
on Moreno's switching lines at the Braniff counter, and then his
switching airlines when he walked over to the Southwest ticket
counter where he finally purchased a ticket. But such action
may or may not indicate nervousness; in this day of overcrowded
facilities, such actions may be nothing more than signs of mere
impatience. Furthermore, it would appear that the inconsistencies which Granados noted in Moreno's explanation of his arrival
time and destination in San Antonio are not the kind which courts
have usually found sufficient to warrant the intrusion of a passenger's person at an airport. In United States v. Lindsey, 27 there
were inconsistencies in the names given by the defendant to airline officials for identification purposes. In contrast, when Moreno arrived in San Antonio and where he went once he did arrive
should not pose the same concern to an airline and, hence,
should not arouse the same level of suspicion as was aroused in
the Lindsey situation.
Thus, two of the three factors on which the Moreno court
based its decision are without merit. The only remaining factor
which might justify Granados' stop and frisk of Moreno is the
bulge in Moreno's coat pocket. Yet, even that factor may not
have warranted the instant intrusion. Indeed, there is case law
authority which holds directly to the contrary. A bulging coat
pocket alone is "not sufficient cause to frisk the defendant even
under the lower standards of the 'stop-and-frisk' doctrine."'2 8
Even conceding that Moreno's stop and frisk was justified,
his privacy was invaded to a degree not permitted under the
Terry doctrine. In a Terry stiuation, the officer must first frisk
7. Frisk.
The Marshal pats-down the external clothing of the subject in order to discovery if he is carrying any weapons.

Depending upon what

is found as a result of the frisk, boarding is permitted or the person is
detained

...

"

27. 451 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1972).
28. People v. Erdman, 69 Misc. 2d 103, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654, 660 (Sup. Ct.
1972). There, defendant was in line with other prospective passengers in the airline jetway to board a plane for Puerto Rico. The customs officer noted a bulge
in defendant's pocket and inquired as to its contents. The defendant replied
"a pair of gloves." The officer then patted the pocket and requested the gloves.
In examining them, the officer found a bag of marijuana. The court held the
marijuana inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal search because "there were no
facts other than a bulging coat pocket which might indicate the presence of arms
or potential danger." Id. at 659.
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the suspect for the purpose of determining whether or not the
individual is armed. Only if the officer feels an object which
he reasonably believes to be a weapon is he justified in reaching
inside the suspect's clothes for the suspected weapon. 29 Applying
Terry to airport searches, the federal district court in United
States v. Lopez3" noted that a person who fits the profile or who
activates the magnetometer (neither of which were used in Moreno) may be frisked for weapons. Yet,
any intrusion by a marshal beyond the legitimate scope
of a weapons search is clearly unjustified and the fruits of
such an excessive search would
be inadmissable in a subse31
quent criminal proceeding.
In Moreno, the defendant was asked to identify the contents
of his pocket, implying that the officer could not tell from the
pat-down search whether or not the suspect carried a weapon.
It is not surprising that the officer could not determine the contents of the bulge since the heroin was wrapped in cellophane
which is, presumably, semi-soft. In contrast to other cases in
which the search of a bulging pocket was upheld where the
bulge was hard and thus the searcher might reasonably believe
that a weapon was present, the relatively soft bulge in this situation
should have put the officer on notice-before he thoroughly
2
searched Moreno's coat-that the bulge was not a weapon.
In addition, it is generally held that absent an emergency
situation or knowing consent, probable cause to believe that contraband will be found in a specific area is not sufficient justification for a search without a warrant. 33 Here there was no emergency. Moreno, surrounded by security guards and not in the
airline boarding area, could do nothing to further a hijacking
attempt if such had been his original goal. In addition, Moreno
did not consent to the search. In response to the marshal's query
of what was in his pocket, he pulled out papers which proved not
to be the cause of the bulge; he was then ordered to remove the
coat at which time it was searched. Arguably, the officer should
have obtained a search warrant prior to his search of the coat.
29.
30.
31.
32.

392 U.S. at 29-30.
328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum).
Id. at 1098.
In many airport cases, where a frisk and then a search of a bulging

pocket has been upheld, the courts have made special note that the bulge in
question was hard, thus intimating that had it been soft, the court might not
have agreed with the officer's decision to reach into the suspect's pocket and
extract the object in question. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d
701, 704 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); United States v.
Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797, 802 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lopez, 328 F.
Supp. 1077, 1098 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (conviction reversed on other grounds).

33. See, e.g., People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 907 (1972).
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Yet, in justifying the search of Moreno's coat, the court
warns us in no uncertain terms that
enough plastic explosives to blow up an airplane can be concealed in a toothpaste tube. A detonator3 4 planted in a fountain pen is all that is required to set it off.
Even though there is truth in the court's observation, the fear
which develops from this fact should not be used to justify
searches of any degree. Such an extension is unconscionable and
would render meaningless both fourth amendment guarantees
and the limits of investigatory activity embodied in the balancing
test of Terry-the governmental interest versus the right of the
35
individual to be left alone.
As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals analogized airport
searches to border searches in which a search may be made on
the basis of mere suspicion.3 6 The fallacy of such an analogy
is two-fold. First, the governmental interest in each situation is
different. The rational for permitting "mere suspicion" intrusions in the border crossing situation is that such searches are
necessary for "national self-protection. ' 37 However, the governmental interest in an airport is to protect the lives of passengers
and crew and preserve airline property from the dangers of hijackings.38 In addition, because the Moreno court expressly based
its decision on Terry rather than on the border search analogy,
there would seem to be little if any need for the Moreno court to
discuss this analogy. Indeed, the court expressly rejected the
border search analogy as inapplicable to the instant circumstances.3 9 However, the fact that the court not only discussed
the border search analogy but did so at some length implies that
the court may have been laying the groundwork for future use of
the analogy-perhaps to condone later airport searches conducted
on the basis of mere suspicion.
Yet, if such a standard were to be followed in an airport context, the Terry safeguards and fourth amendment guarantees
34. Id. at 49.
35. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals established a limit to such searches
when, in United States v. Kroll, 13 Cr. Law Rep. 2427, 2428 (8th Cir. July 10,
1973), the court held that while the search of the defendant's attache case at
the boarding area was reasonable as he had activated the magnetometer, the

search of a 9 " by 4" envelope with a 1/2" by 2" bulge was not.

The govern-

ment could not establish by the size of the envelope and the bulge that a minia-

turized weapon was inside.

Consequently, the amphetamines found in the en-

velope were suppressed.

36. While border searches must measure up to the constitutional
standard of reasonableness, suspicion that a person is carrying merchandise unlawfully imported into the United States is sufficient.
Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
37. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
38. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 51 n.8.
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would be greatly eroded.

Anyone would be subject to search"

on the basis of the mere whim 4 of a United States Marshal. The
potential for abuse is obvious. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals ignored its own warning in Moreno that the urgency of air piracy alone is not sufficient justification for a war-

rantless airport search.4 2 In so doing, that court not only exceeded the F.A.A. standards,4" but indulged in yet another bootstrap argument when, by use of the border search analogy, it held
in United States v. Skipwith 44 that:
[w]hile Moreno established that searches of persons in the
general airport area are to be tested under a case-by-case
application of the reasonableness standard . . . those who
actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier,
like those seeking entrance into the country, are45 subject to
a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion.
The number of courts hearing airport search and seizure cases
is growing, for these searches are carried out daily in most public
airports throughout the country. There is a danger that cases such
as Moreno may be followed by other courts, state and federal,
thus further eroding fourth amendment rights.

The California Supreme Court has recognized the necessity
of resolving questions in this area of the law 46 and has granted
hearing 47 in three recent California airport search and seizure
cases.4 8 The holding in one of these cases was based partly on

40. The question thus presented is whether United States Marshals will be
allowed only to reach into a suspect's pockets or will strip searches also be
allowed, as they are in border crossings, on the basis of "mere suspicion"
(United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 832 (5th Cir. 1971) ). See text accompanying notes 41-45 infra. Will the next step in airport searches be body
cavity searches-also allowed in border crossings, the test being "clear indication" (Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966) )--on the
grounds that, as weapons may be miniaturized, a potential hijacker might
bring such weapons on board an airplane in a variety of body cavities?
41. Any action on the part of a potential passenger could be used by a
United States Marshal to arouse his "mere suspicions."
42. 475 F.2d at 47.
43. The F.A.A. standards consist of a step-by-step approach in investigating a potential hijacker. See note 26 supra for further explanation of the
standards.
44. 13 Cr. Law Rep. 2307 (5th Cir. June 14, 1973).
45. Id. at 2307-2308.
46. Under Rule 29 of the California Rules of Court, one of the criteria
for the granting of a hearing by the California Supreme Court is "(1) where it
appears necessary to secure uniformity of decisions or the settlement of important
questions of law ... .

47. People v. Hyde, 33 Cal. App. 3d 128, 108 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973), hearing
granted, August 20, 1973; People v. Lee, 32 Cal. App. 3d 773, 108 Cal. Rptr. 555
(1973), hearing granted, August 20, 1973; People v. Bleile, 33 Cal. App. 3d 203,
108 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1973), hearing granted, August 20, 1973.
48. People v. Hyde, 33 Cal. App. 3d 128, 108 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973) (defendant fit the hijacker profile and activated the magnetometer. He was then
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the Moreno rationale.4 9 For the sake of preserving the fourth
amendment rights ot the California air traveling public, that court

should severly restrict the applicability of the Moreno decision in
California.
Cheryl Melissa Poncini

PANDERING-SUCCESSFUL PROCUREMENT NOT NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION OF COMPLETED CRIME-People
v. Bradshaw, 31 Cal. App. 3d 421, 107 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1973).

Edward Bradshaw was contacted by a policewoman working undercover on a tip that Bradshaw was involved in prostitution

in Los Angeles.

He and the agent had two telephone conversa-

tions and one face-to-face conversation to discuss the policewoman's entering a house of prostitution under the defendant's supervision. When they met to finalize their arrangements, Bradshaw
was arrested and charged with "procuring, causing, inducing, persuading, and encouraging"' the policewoman to become a prossearched by an air marshal without his consent. Defendant's conviction for
possession of restricted dangerous drugs was reversed by the Court of Appeal:
while the request to make the search was justified under the circumstances, the
search itself without defendant's consent, was not); People v. Lee, 32 Cal. App.
3d 773, 108 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1973) (after activating a magnetometer, defendant
was approached by a federal marshal who identified himself and expressed the
desire to frisk the defendant and search his flight bag. Defendant agreed to
the search. In searching the flight bag, the marshal found several illegal
drugs. Defendant's conviction for possession of those drugs was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals); People v. Bleile, 33 Cal. App. 3d 203, 108 Cal. Rptr. 602
(1973) (after defendant, carrying hand luggage, activated the magnetometer
in the boarding area, he was asked to pass through it again without the luggage.
After he failed to reactivate the magnetomer, the marshal asked him to open his
luggage for inspection whereupon the marshal noted an odor of marijuana and
subsequently found two cellophane bags of it in the defendant's luggage. Defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana was upheld by the Court of
Appeals).
49. People v. Bleile, 33 Cal. App. 3d 203, 108 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1973).
1. People v. Bradshaw, 31 Cal. App. 3d 421, 423 n.3, 107 Cal. Rptr. 256,
257 n.3 (1973). The court points out in the footnote that the specific charge
uses the "verbiage" of subsections (a) and (b) of section 266i of the Penal Code.
The information contains the verbiage of subsection (a) that the defendant "procured" the policewoman, but the rest of the opinion discusses Bradshaw's conduct
in terms of a violation of subsection (b). Because the court makes no reference
to a violation by Bradshaw of subsection (a) other than in equivocal terms in the
footnote cited above, and because it is highly debatable whether Bradshaw procured the policewoman, the rest of this note will proceed under the assumption
that Bradshaw's conviction for pandering was upheld on the grounds that he violated subsection (b).
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titute in violation of subsections
(a) and (b) of section 266i of
2
the California Penal Code.
Relying on an entrapment theory,' the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County granted a defense motion to set aside the information. After the trial court dismissed the prosecution, the
People appealed.4 The Court of Appeal for the Second District
held that there was ample evidence to show reasonable cause to

believe the defendant guilty of encouraging the undercover agent

to become a prostitute and dismissed defendant's entrapment defense.' The Court specifically rejected the defendant's two main
contentions concerning the proper interpretation of the statute.
First, the court held that the word "encourage" in Penal Code

section 266i (b) does not mean that persons charged under that
subsection are not guilty of the completed crime unless they are
successful in their encouragement of the potential prostitute."
Second, a defendant need not have the specific intent to encourage a person to become a prostitute who was not one previously.'
The order to dismiss the information was reversed."
The entrapment theory was discarded by the court as inapplicable. The generally accepted view is that a law enforcement
2.

§ 266i (West 1970) reads:
Any person who: (a) procures another person for the purpose of
prostitution; or (b) by promises, threats, violence, or by any device or
scheme, causes, induces, persuades or encourages another person to
become a prostitute; or (c) procures for another person a place as
inmate in a house of prostitution or as an inmate of any place in which
prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state; or (d) by
promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, causes, induces,
persuades or encourages an inmate of a house of prostitution, or any
other place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed, to remain
therein as an inmate; or (e) by fraud or artifice, or by duress of person
or goods, or by abuse of any position of confidence or authority,
procures another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to enter any
place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state, or
to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution; or (f) receives or gives, or agrees to receive or give, any money
or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure, another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to come into this state or leave
this state for the purpose of prostitution, is guilty of pandering, a
felony, and is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not
less than one year nor more than 10 years.
3. BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 627 (4th ed. 19,51) defines entrapment:
The act of officers or agents of the government in inducing a person
to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.
(Citations omitted).
But the mere act of an officer furnishing the accused an opportunity to
commit the crime, where the criminal intent was already present in the
accused's mind, is not ordinarily entrapment. (Citations omitted).
The Bradshaw court discusses the superior court's granting of the motion
to dismiss at 31 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
4. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 423, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
5. Id. at 426, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
6. Id. at 425, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
7. Id. at 426, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
8. Id. at 426, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
CAL. PEN. CODE
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official engages in entrapment when, for the purposes of instituting a criminal prosecution against a person, the agent originates
the idea of the crime and induces the defendant to commit the
crime when the defendant would not otherwise do soY The
facts in Bradshaw indicate that the policewoman made contact
with Bradshaw to discuss the possibility of the agent entering a
house of prostitution under the defendant's supervision. At first
glance, such a situation would indicate an entrapment, since the
inference can be drawn that the agent contacted the defendant
with the hope that he would commit the crime of pandering.
However, the entrapment defense was not sustained because the
court concluded that the defendant would have committed the
crime without any inducement. 10 The record does not contain
sufficient information to challenge intelligently the court's conclusion that the defendant was predisposed to procuring women
for prostitution by his eager negotiation with the agent," and the
appellate court's cursory disposal of the entrapment theory seems
to imply that the higher court would require a defendant to seriously hesitate to deal with a policewoman in a Bradshaw situation before a lack of predisposition to commit pandering would
be found.
Dictionary definitions of "encourage" are not helpful in resolving the defendant's first contention because the crucial issue
it
in determining the meaning of the word is the context in which 12
is used. The Bradshaw court dismissed two California cases
which involved actual procurement as inapplicable in determining
whether "encourage" implies successful persuasion. Furthermore,
cases 13 involving convictions for attempted pandering without any
9. The leading cases on the subject of entrapment are: United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (manufacture of narcotics using a government
supplied ingredient which was difficult but not impossible to obtain held not to
constitute entrapment); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (sale of
narcotics induced by unpaid government informer); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435 (1932) (sale of liquor induced by U.S. government prohibition agent).
10. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 423, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
11. Id. The court does not refer to the paucity of evidence of defendant's
predisposition; instead, the court simply states that Bradshaw eagerly negotiated
with the policewoman.
12. In People v. Matsicura, 19 Cal. App. 75, 124 P. 882 (1912), the defendant was convicted of pandering on evidence that he arranged to have a room
available in his house of prostitution for a certain woman. However, he was
arrested before she ever occupied the room. The court of appeals reversed.
However, in People v. Caravella, 5 Cal. App. 3d 931, 85 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1970),
the defendant operated a photography studio where nude models were available
for photographers. He solicited one model who engaged in numerous acts of
prostitution arranged by defendant. The court of appeal upheld his conviction
for pandering.
Matsicura and Caravella are both cited at 31 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 258.
13. In People v. Mitchell, 91 Cal. App. 2d 214, 205 P.2d 101 (1949), the
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discussion of subsection (b) of section 266i were also dismissed
by the Bradshaw court. If an actual procurement occurs, the
panderer either assisted, induced, persuaded, or encouraged the
person involved to become a prostitute for the first time or at
least to change employers. 4 Consequently, the opinions in cases

involving actual procurement need not mention the word "encourage" in the context of subsection (b) because such discussion
would generally be irrelevant.' 5
People v. Charles'6 and People v. Mitchell'7 do not consider
the possible guilt of the defendants under subsection (b). However, these two cases are relevant to a discussion of Bradshaw
because each analyzes the differences between the crime of pandering and attempted pandering.' 8 The Charles court held the
defendant guilty of attempted pandering when he failed by reason
of extraneous circumstances to procure his victim for a house
of prostitution.' 9 When this discussion of the completed crime
versus a mere attempt is applied to Bradshaw, the crucial question is whether the fact that the woman was a policewoman who

had no intention of accepting the defendant's offer becomes a
defendant, who contacted a policewoman and encouraged her to become a
prostitute for him, was convicted of attempted pandering. Similarly, in People
v. Charles, 218 Cal. App. 2d 812, 32 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1963), two women approached by defendant contacted the police prior to any actual procurement of
them. Defendant was convicted of attempted pandering.
Mitchell and Charles are both cited at 31 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 258.
14. People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (1941), involved a defendant charged with procuring a female in violation of subsection
(a) of the pandering statute. "The term 'procure' as used in the first clause of
section 1 of the statute necessarily implies the use of persuasion, encouragement,
and assistance in achieving the unlawful purpose.......
Id. at 12, 112 P.2d
at 445.
15. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 258. The Bradshaw court
stresses the fact that most other cases do not mention the word "encourage" in
the context of subsection (b) of California Penal Code section 266i. People v.
Lax, 20 Cal. App. 3d 481, 486-87, 97 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1971), discusses
subsection (b) where an actual procurement occurred. However, that discussion
merely points out the fact mentioned in the text that an actual procurement can
establish a violation of subsection (b) as well.
16. 218 Cal. App. 2d 812, 32 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1963).
17. 91 Cal. App. 2d 214, 205 P.2d 101 (1949).
18. CAL. PEN. CODE § 664 (West 1970) reads in part:
Every person who attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration thereof, is punishable, where
no provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempts. ...
19. 218 Cal. App. 2d at 819, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 658, quoting 91 Cal. App. 2d
214, 217-18, 205 P.2d 101, 104:
Pandering is established when the evidence shows that the accused has
succeeded in inducing his victim to become an inmate of a house of
prostitution. Attempted pandering is proved by evidence of the acts of
the accused which have failed to accomplish the actor's purpdse by reason of its frustration by extraneous circumstances rather than by virtue
of a change of heart on the part of the one who made the attempt.
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similar extraneous circumstance.2" The answer would seem to be
yes, as there is no indication in the fact situation that the failure
to procure the agent as a prostitute was due to a change of heart
by Bradshaw.
A comparison of the facts of Mitchell with those of Bradshaw is also interesting. Mitchell and a policewoman had a number of discussions about the agent's entering Mitchell's employ
as a prostitute. Mitchell was later arrested, charged with attempted pandering, and convicted of that crime. 2
The only
important difference between the policewoman-defendant contacts in Mitchell and in Bradshaw is that in the latter case,
the policewoman contacted the defendant first. The significance of this distinction would only apply to the validity of an
entrapment defense, which the Bradshaw court deemed inapplicable to the defendant. This difference does not render the
Mitchell case inapplicable. Instead, the difference makes Bradshaw the stronger case for application of the entrapment theory.
The foregoing analysis delves further into Charles and Mitchell than did the Bradshaw court, which thought these two cases
were inapplicable because they concern convictions for attempted
pandering.2 2 However, a deeper consideration of these cases indicates that attempted pandering should not be so quickly dismissed as inapplicable to the Bradshaw facts. As mentioned earlier, the use of the term "procure" in any of the subsections necessarily implies the use of persuasion, encouragement, or other enticement. In most cases in which the defendant is convicted of
the completed crime under one of the subsections involving an
actual procurement, he could as easily be convicted under subsection (b), since he must have used persuasion or encouragement
to procure the person involved. 23 A converse issue is whether a
person in a situation such as Bradshaw could have been convicted
of the completed crime had he been charged under another subsection. Subsections (a), (c), and (e) seem to require an actual
procurement as the essential element of the crime.2 4 Subsection
20. The Charles court stated that under the rule quoted in note 19 supra,
the refusal of the person solicited to accept the proposal to become an inmate
of a house of prostitution is an extraneous circumstance which frustrates his or
her procurement. The fact that the woman involved in Bradshaw was a policewoman who never intended to become a prostitute implied from the start that
she would never accept Bradshaw's proposal. 218 Cal. App. 2d at 819, 32 Cal.
Rptr. at 658.
21. 91 Cal. App. 2d at 216, 205 P.2d at 103.
22. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
23. People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 12, 117 P.2d 437, 445
(1941). See also People v. Lax, 20 Cal. App. 3d 481, 486-87, 97 Cal. Rptr. 722,
725 (1971).
24. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 426, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259. The Bradshaw court
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(d) involves dealings with a person who is already an inmate of
a house of prostitution.25 Subsection (f) makes the parties to an
agreement to procure or attempt to procure for financial gain
guilty of pandering.26 The implication of Bradshaw is that section 266i (b) allows the People to convict for pandering without
an actual procurement where under other sections they might only
be able to secure a conviction for attempted pandering.
Bradshaw's immediate concern was to persuade the court of
appeals that "encourage" in subsection (b) requires a successful
procurement. The court in its rejection of this argument relied
The
on a coupling of People v. Lax27 with People v. Frey.2
claimed
but
Bradshaw court admitted that Lax is distinguishable,
that reliance on the case was justified since it was the closest California case it could find.29 The fact situation in Lax did not involve a policewoman, and the case may be further distinguished
by the actual procurement of the girl involved and her act of sexual intercourse with her procuror. 0 Therefore, the Lax court correctly stated that the evidence which established that the defendant
procured the woman also established that he encouraged her to become a prostitute in violation of subsection (b).3 1 Thus, under
these facts, the Lax holding lends support to Bradshaw's conclusion that the use of "encourage" in subsection (b) implies a successful procurement.
The Bradshaw court coupled the reference in Lax to subsection (b) with the decision in People v. Frey in an attempt to
states that subsections (a) and (c) appear to require a successful procurement.
Subsection (e), by its own terms, requires a procurement under coercive circumstances.
25. Id.
26. People v. Charles, 218 Cal. App. 2d 812, 818, 32 Cal. Rptr. 653, 657

(1963).

Referring to subsection (f) of California Penal Code section 266i, the

court states:

".

.

. These provisions of the statute . .. . contemplate, in sub-

stance, the employment of a person for 'procuring' or 'attempting to procure'."
27.

People v. Lax, 20 Cal. App. 3d 481, 97 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1971).

De-

fendant encouraged a woman to engage in prostitution for him. After several
conversations about financial arrangements, she agreed to take the job and
moved into an apartment used by defendant's women. She subsequently moved
out after having intercourse with only the defendant. Defendant's conviction
for pandering was affirmed.
28. People v. Frey, 228 Cal. App. 2d 33, 39 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1964). Defendant Frey owned a hotel where a number of prostitutes worked.

Frey was

convicted of several pimping and pandering counts, including one count of violating subsection (f) of section 266i in agreeing with other co-defendants to give
them things of value for procuring or attempting to procure a policewoman as
an inmate of his house of prostitution.
The court specifically states its reliance on Lax and Frey at 31 Cal. App. 3d
at 425, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
29. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 425, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.

30. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 485-87, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
31.

31 Cal. App. 3d at 425, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59, quoting 20 Cal. App.

3d at 486-87, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
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meet the "encouragement implies success" argument. 3 2 Frey was
convicted of violating subsection (f) in another case involving an
undercover policewoman.8" The Frey holding is that a successful procurement is not a necessary element of a violation of subsection (f) of the pandering statute. All the offender need do to
violate that subsection is to have an agreement with a third party
to procure for that third party's place of prostitution. 4 The
Bradshaw court implied that, according to Frey, a successful procurement is not a necessary element of the crime of pandering
because Frey's conviction was upheld without discussion of such
an issue.3" However, it is misleading for the Bradshaw court to
rely on a case involving a violation of a subsection which does
not require success for conviction of the completed crime. Thus,
reliance on the combined effect of Lax and Frey to counter
Bradshaw's argument is unconvincing.
The Bradshaw court quickly disposed of the defense's second argument that the use of the verb "to become" in subsection
(b) implies that the woman must not have been a prostitute prior
to any encouragement and that the defendant must have been
aware of her prior "chastity". 3 6 The court correctly stated that
in cases such as Lax where there was an actual procurement, the
prior status of the woman is clearly irrelevant because the offense
charged is not that of encouraging a person to become a prostitute, but actually procuring the person."
However, defendant
argued that the chastity requirement relates specifically to a situation where the defendant, knowing that the woman involved has
never been a prostitute, encourages her to change her lifestyle and
become one. The only valid application of this argument would
be to a charge of violating subsection (b) of section 266i because that is the only subsection using the infinitive "to become".
Therefore, the Bradshaw court placed undue reliance on Frey
when the court stated that it was bound to follow the result of
Frey. 8 Such reliance is unjustified since the defense's argument
related specifically to the offense proscribed in (b), while Frey
was charged with violating subsection (f).
The court did repeat the argument found in many pandering
decisions that the amount of sexual experience of the person in32. Id. at 425, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
33. 228 Cal. App. 2d 33, 39 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1964).
34. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 424-25, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 258.

35.
(1963).
36.
37.
38.

People v. Charles, 218 Cal. App. 2d 812, 818, 32 Cal. Rptr. 653, 657
31 Cal. App. 3d at 425, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
Id. at 425-26, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
Id. at 426, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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volved is immaterialY 9 However, instead of developing this line
of reasoning, the court chose to rely on the implications of Frey
and to avoid squarely confronting the issue raised by Bradshaw.
People v. Bradshaw has important implications completely
aside from the specific reasoning of the court. The result of the
decision is that the People may charge a person with a violation
of Penal Code section 266i (b) and obtain a conviction for the
completed crime although they might only be able to obtain a conviction for attempted pandering under one of the other subsections. The difference in jail sentences is significant. A conviction for pandering carries a sentence of from one to ten years
in state prison.40 A conviction for attempted pandering may carry
jail to no
a sentence of anywhere from a few months in county
41
more than five years in state prison or county jail. ' The court's
reading of subsection (b) makes the crime of attempted pandering superfluous since a suspect could usually be charged with encouraging a person to become a prostitute in a situation where
there was no actual procurement.
The decision to charge a suspected panderer with violating
subsection (b) of California Penal Code section 266i may mean
longer incarceration for him than if he were charged under another
subsection. After Bradshaw, that choice is within the discretion
of the local district attorney. Such discretion raises the question
whether Penal Code section 266i reasonably defines the elements of
the completed crime of pandering. The United States Supreme
Court has frequently stressed that the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection require that all persons have notice
of what constitutes forbidden conduct.4 2 Penal Code section 266i
(b) clearly states that to encourage a person to become a prostitute is conduct in violation of the law. However, as the foregoing analysis of the Bradshaw opinion indicates, it is not clear that
the completed crime of pandering in violation of subsection (b)
need not include an actual procurement. In other words, section 266i is reasonably definite under a narrow interpretation, but
the Bradshaw court's interpretation of subsection (b) of that statute renders that subsection vague as written.
The United States Supreme Court has also consistently disapproved laws which facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by prosecuting officials.4" If a district attorney may
consider his chances of securing a conviction of the completed
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 266i (West 1970).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 644 (West 1970).
E.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
Id.
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crime of pandering and then decide that he may be able to secure
such a conviction only by charging under subsection (b), the
chances for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement abound.
After Bradshaw, there is clearly the possibility that district attorneys will take full advantage of this opportunity to effectively make
the crime of attempted pandering superfluous.
Neil M. Schwartz

FELONY-MURDER--ELIMINATION OF THE ELEMENT OF
SCRAMBLING POSSESSION FOR APPLICATION OF THE
FELONY-MURDER RULE TO ROBBERY-People v. Salas,
7 Cal. 3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1972).
In an attempt to deter criminal activity, old English law categorized many different crimes as felonies and treated them
equally as capital offenses. Because an attempted felony was
only a misdemeanor and consequently not punishable by death,
a rule was devised by the English lawmakers elevating an attempted
felony to the level of a capital offense when such an attempt also
resulted in the loss of a human life. Thus the so-called felonymurder rule was born. When public conscience began to pale at
the spectacle of numerous public executions, judicial reform began, eventually leading to reform in the number of crimes punishable as capital offenses. Similarly, strict enforcement of the felony-murder rule was looked upon with judicial disfavor and, as
a result, the application of the felony-murder rule was narrowed to
a decreasing number of specified offenses. Eventually, the felony-murder rule was abolished in England.'
In California a
similar trend was taking place until the interesting decision of the
California Supreme Court in People v. Salas.2
Francisco Salas robbed a Sacramento bar at gunpoint on
June 7, 1968, and then fled with an accomplice in the latter's
car. Shortly thereafter a patrolling deputy received a radio report of the bar robbery. Because the deputy knew that a nearby
intersection was along the route frequently used by robbers escaping from the general area where the robbery occurred, he immediately drove to that intersection. As he approached the intersection, the deputy sighted a single car coming from the direction of the bar, containing two men apparently of Mexican de1. English Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1 (1957).
2. 7 Cal. 3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1972).
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The deputy followed the car briefly and, when subse-

quently advised over the police radio that the suspect was a "male

Mexican," activated his red light and siren and pulled the suspect
vehicle to the side of the road. During the effort to capture the
suspects, another deputy arrived to assist the first officer and was
shot and killed by Salas.

After being convicted by a jury of first degree murder under
the felony-murder rule,8 Salas contended on appeal that, as a
matter of law, the robbery had been committed prior to the time

of and at a different place than the killing. He therefore argued

that the homicide could not have been committed in the course of
the robbery within the felony-murder rule and that the trial court

erred in instructing the jury on such a rule.4 Salas further contended that, even assuming the propriety of the instruction given
on the felony-murder rule, it was error for the court to refuse to
define the term "scrambling possession",' as applied to possession
of the proceeds of the robbery.

In its instructions to the jury the trial court gave four instructions concerning the time within which a robbery is considered
still in progress for the purpose of applying the felony-murder
rule. Instructions 1 and 3 require the jury to find both that the
robber did not win his way to a "place of temporary safety" and

that his possession of the stolen goods was no more than "scram-

bling possession" in order to find that the robbery was still in progress.' On the other hand, instructions 2 and 4 required the
3. The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon
who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony and classifies the
offense as murder of the first degree in homicides which are the direct result of
those six felonies [including robbery] enumerated in section 189 of the California
Penal Code. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 538, 450 P.2d 580, 589, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 197 (1969). Cf. note 24 and 25 infra.
4. 7 Cal. 3d at 820, 500 P.2d at 12-13, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
5. "Scrambling possession" was defined by Chief Justice Wright in the majority opinion in Salas as meaning "that the robber is being immediately pursued
and his felonious possession of the loot is being challenged 'immediately upon
the forcible taking'." 7 Cal. 3d at 822, 500 P.2d at 14, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
See also note 8 infra.
6. Jury instruction 1: "A robbery is still in commission while the perpertrator is being pursued immediately after the commission of the act of taking
the property of another by force or fear with the fruits of the crime in his possession so long as the culprit has not won his way even momentarily to a place
of temporary safety and the possession of his plunder is nothing more than
scrambling possession."
Jury instruction 3: "If the robbery has not been completed and terminated
prior to the killing, then the robbery may not be used to find the defendant
guilty of murder of the first degree. Whether the killing was committed during
the perpetration of the robbery must be decided by the jury.
"A robbery is still being committed, no matter how far from the scene of
the robbery, nor how long afterward, if the robber has not won his way even
momentarily to a place of temporary safety and the possession of the plunder
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jury only to find that the robber did not win his way to a "place
of temporary safety"-that is, that the robber was still attempting
to escape-to find that the robbery was still in progress. 7
The issue before the California Supreme Court was whether
the killing of the deputy, after Salas had been stopped while fleeing from the scene of the robbery, was a killing in the "perpetration" of the robbery and therefore within the purview of the fel-

ony-murder rule.'

Essential to the resolution of that issue, how-

ever, was the question of whether the trial court properly utilized
the requirements of "place of temporary safety" and "scrambling
possession."

The dual criteria of a "place of temporary safety" and "scrambling possession" first appeared as jury instructions in the landmark case of People v. Boss9 and apparently required the jury to
find that the robber did not win his way to a "place of temporary
safety" and that his possession of his plunder was no more than a

"scrambling possession" before the jury could find that the rob-

bery was still in progress for the purpose of application of the fel-

ony-murder rule. The legal effect of reaching a "place of temporary safety" was to establish that the robber's possession of
his spoils was no longer being challenged and that he was no longis nothing more than a scrambling possession." (This instruction was given at
the request of Salas.) 7 Cal. 3d at 820 n.5, 500 P.2d at 13 n.5, 103 Cal. Rptr.
at 436-37 n.5.
7. Jury instruction 2: "A robbery is still in commission during the continuous, integrated attempt to successfully leave with the loot."
Jury instruction 4: "If the robbery had been completed and terminated prior
to the killing then the robbery may not be used to find the defendant guilty of
the murder of the first degree. On the other hand, the unlawful killing of a
human being which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate
robbery, the commission of which crime itself must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is murder of the first degree whether the killing was intentional,
unintentional or even accidental.
"Whether the killing was committed during the perpetration of robbery must
be decided by the jury.
"A robbery is still being committed no matter how far from the scene of
the robbery nor how long afterward if the robber has not won his way, even
momentarily, to a place of temporary safety. That is to say, that a robbery is
not completed at the moment the robber obtains possession of the stolen property, but is still in progress during the robber's attempt to escape with the loot.
In other words, the escape of the robbers with the loot is a part of the robbery
itself." (This instruction was given at the request of the prosecution.) 7 Cal.
at 820-21 n.5, 500 P.2d at 13 n.5, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37 n.5.
8. 7 Cal. 3d at 820, 500 P.2d at 13, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
9. 210 Cal. 245, 290 P. 881 (1930). In the factual setting of Boss, two
defendants robbed a store and ran into the street; an employee immediately pursued them and was shot by Boss a moment later when the furthermost defendant
was no more than 125 feet from the store. The court held that the killing was
committed in the perpetration of the robbery inasmuch as the defendants had
"... not won their way even momentarily to a place of temporary safety and
the possession of the plunder [was] nothing more than a scrambling possession."
Id. at 250-51, 290 P. at 883.
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er fleeing or trying to escape. 10 Similarly, "scrambling possession" denominates a forcible taking followed immediately by pursuit to challenge the felon's possession of the stolen property."
In deciding Salas, the California Supreme Court held that
the two-prong test originally set forth in Boss was no longer necessary to determine whether a homicide fell within the purview of
the felony-murder rule and that only a failure to reach a "place
of temporary safety" was required.' 2 Under the facts of Salas
the court found that the homicide occurred before the robbers
had reached a place of temporary safety," hence the robbery had
not yet ended and the homicide committed while the robbery continued in progress constituted first degree murder under the felony-murder rule.' 4
In support of its decision the Salas court relied upon People
v. Kendrick" and People v. Ketchel.16 In Kendrick the robber
was stopped for a traffic violation by a policeman 48 minutes after the commission of a robbery. The robber, believing the officer was about to arrest him for the robbery, shot and killed him.
The Salas court noted that the felony-murder conviction was obtained in Kendrick despite the absence of any discussion of "scrambling possession."" To the Salas majority the dispositive fact
safety,
was Kendrick's failure to reach a point of temporary
8
rule.'
felony-murder
the
within
him
bringing
thereby
In People v. Ketchel, defendants committed a robbery and
were immediately pursued, but before reaching a place of temporary safety they killed a policeman who was chasing them.
Both elements of the Boss test were present, but as in Kendrick,
the Ketchel court decided the case only on the failure of the defendants to reach a place of temporary safety.' 9 The majority in
Salas relied heavily on this aspect of the Ketchel decision which
ignored the element of "scrambling possession. '"20
Justice Peters, in his dissent in Salas, correctly points out
10. 7 Cal. 3d at 822, 500 P.2d at 14, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 823-24, 500 P.2d at 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
13. Id. at 823, 500 P.2d at 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
14. Id. Further, the alleged error by the court to give the requested instructions on "scrambling possession" resulted in no prejudice to Salas since
the jury had to find that the homicide was committed before he had reached a
place of temporary safety. Thus, the introduction of the concepts of pursuit and
scrambling possession conferred benefits on Salas to which he was not entitled.
7 Cal. 3d at 823-24, 500 P.2d at 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
15. 56 Cal. 2d 71, 363 P.2d 13, 14 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961)..
16. 59 Cal. 2d 503, 381 P.2d 394, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963).
17. 7 Cal. 3d at 823, 500 P.2d at 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
18. Id. at 823, 500 P.2d at 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
19. 59 Cal. 2d 503, 524, 381 P.2d 394, 404, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 548 (1963).
20. 7 Cal. 3d at 823, 500 P.2d at 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
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that the reason only one element of the Boss test was applied in Ketchel was because there the defendants had based their defense

solely upon having reached a place of temporary safety, and had
failed to raise the question of whether they were in "scrambling
possession" of the goods stolen at the time of the homicide. 2 '

Fearing an unnecessary expansion of the felony-murder rule,
which would run directly counter to previous California decisions22 and to the modern trend followed in most other American jurisdictions, as well as in England,2" Justice Peters argued

strongly that the dual criteria of Boss should be maintained.2 4
He expressed concern that predicating the felony-murder rule on

the single element of a "place of temporary safety," without the
further necessity of proving the homicide to have been committed
while the felon was in "scrambling possession" of the stolen goods,
was a departure from the statutory language of sections 18925 and
21120 of the California Penal Code.

Furthermore, once the lit-

eral definition of robbery in section 211 of the Penal Code was departed from, any test that might be used to determine whether a
robbery was complete for the purposes of the felony-murder rule
would be necessarily arbitrary. In the instant case, such a test

would make the length of the escape route the decisive consideration.2 7 For example, under the rationale of the majority opinion, an accidental death resulting from an automobile accident occurring during the escape of the robber, and in the total absence
of any direct pursuit by victims, witnesses or police could be

classified as first degree felony-murder.
21. Id. at 827-28, 500 P.2d at 18, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
22. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431, 440, 462 P.2d 22, 29, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 500 (1970); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539, 450 P.2d 580, 590,
75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198 (1969); People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414 P.2d
353, 360-61, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1966); People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d
777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965).
23. For the English view, see PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 40 (2d ed. 1969).
The following are among those jurisdictions which restrict the application of the
felony-murder rule to a limited number of offenses or situations: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia. 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide §§ 46,
72 (1968). Annot. 40 A.L.R.3d §§ 5-8, at 1346-51 (1971). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 (1970). Additionally, the Model Penal Code expresses the intent to
substitute a rebuttable presumption for an unyielding felony-murder rule. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.2(1 ) (b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
24. 7 Cal. 3d at 826-31, 500 P.2d at 17-20, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 440-44.
25. CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part: "[M]urder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate . . .
robbery . . . is murder of the first degree; ... "
26. CAL. PEN. CODE § 211 (West 1970) provides in relevant part: "[Rob-

bery is] the felonious taking of personal property of another, from his person or
immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or
fear."
27. 7 Cal. 3d at 829, 500 P.2d at 19, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
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Another method of analyzing the felony-murder rule-not
used by the majority or the dissent in Salas-is occasionally seen
in other cases and may provide clarification of the Boss test. A
majority of cases emphasize causation as the link between the
robbery and the homicide. 28 This is seen more recently in California cases which consider the felony-murder rule applicable if
the robbery and resultant homicide are part of one continuous
transaction.2 9 In fact, the Boss element of "scrambling possession" is really only one link in the causal chain of events, whereas a "place of temporary safety" constitutes the final point or factor which terminates the "continuous transaction" of the robbery.
To place emphasis on a single element within the continuous
transaction of the robbery would be to emphasize strict causation.
Strict causation for felony-murder has not been required in California and, in a case decided after the Boss criteria had been established, the California Supreme Court said:
The law of this state has never required proof of a strict
causal relationship between the felony and the homicide.
The statute [California Penal Code § 189] was adopted for
the protection of the community and its residents, not for
the benefit of the lawbreaker, and this court has viewed it
as obviating the necessity for, rather than requiring any technical inquiry concerning whether there has been a compleof the felony before the
tion, abandonment, or desistence
0
homicide was completed.3
Further analysis reveals that, despite the interpretation of
the Boss decision by the Salas court, the court in Boss may have,
in fact, overlooked the intrinsic relationship between "scrambling
possession" and "place of temporary safety," and that the two
terms may actually both be embodied in the single continuous
transaction of reaching a final place of temporary safety. The
phrase "scrambling possession" is actually a description of one
possible state of affairs which may exist during an individual's
attempts to reach a place of temporary safety. Thus, a robber
cannot have reached a place of temporary safety if he is retaining
his spoils only through the effort of scrambling posession. Yet,
it also follows that the robber may still be in flight toward his
28. See State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632 (1936); State v.
Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950).
29. See, e.g., People v. Welch, 8 Cal. 3d 106, 118, 501 P.2d 225, 233, 104
Cal. Rptr. 217, 225 (1972); People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503, 523, 381 P.2d 394,
404, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 548 (1963); People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal. 2d 71, 90,
363 P.2d 13, 23, 14 Cal. Rptr. 13, 23 (1961); People v. Coefield, 37 Cal. 2d 865,
868-69, 236 P.2d 570, 572 (1951); People v. Chavez, 37 Cal. 2d 656, 670,
234 P.2d 632, 640 (1951); People v. Chapman, 261 Cal. App. 2d 149, 175,
67 Cal. Rptr. 601, 617 (1968).
30. People v. Chavez, 37 Cal. 2d 656, 669-70, 234 P.2d 632, 640 (1951).
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sanctuary without being immediately pursued or without having
his felonious possession of the stolen goods challenged. In the
latter situation, an imagined threat of pursuit or capture (a possible stimulus for "scrambling possession") might provoke a deadly
attack by the robber, as occurred in Kendrick when the robber
shot and killed an approaching 31policeman who wished to question him about a traffic violation.
An insistence upon finding the presence of both elements of
the Boss test before applying the felony-murder rule to a robbery
would place an unnecessary emphasis upon the state of mind and
conduct of the robber. Such an approach would create a recurrent "scrambling possession" by a robber every time a stranger
approached, a siren wailed or he perceived a questioning glance
while enroute to a position of safety. Consequently, the possible
application of the felony-murder rule would depend on the state
of mind of the robber, as he could have alternating intervals of
paranoia, during which the possibility of the felony-murder rule
could spring into existence. Such an interpretation is unworkable
and should not be sustained by the court.
It would appear that, although only one test is now required
for the application of the felony-murder rule to robbery, the expansion of the rule as communicated by Justice Peters in his discussion in Salas has not occurred. By clarifying and simplifying
the required test, the Salas court has actually remained within the
previously accepted concept of a "continuous transaction."
Jud Scott

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-USE OF VOICEPRINTS TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE HELD ADMISSIBLE-Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr.
547 (1973).
During the course of a condemnation suit in California's
Riverside County, the property owner received a telephone call
from a person purporting to be a juror in the action. The caller
indicated that he would like to see the owner "make a lot of money
from his property."' The authorities were advised of this call,
31. 56 Cal. 2d at 89-90, 363 P.2d at 23, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
1. Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 780, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547,
547 (1973).
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and placed a recording device on the property owner's telephone.
Two days later, a similar call was received and recorded.

An investigation ensued, during which Dewey C. Hodo, one

of the jurors, gave police officers a tape recording of his voice.
This voice exemplar was matched with the caller's voice through
a technique of voice identification by means of spectrographs

known as voiceprints. As a result, Hodo was charged with promis-

2
ing to render a verdict for a party, and offering as a juror to receive a bribe.'
At the preliminary hearing, Dr. Oscar Tosi testified as to
the scientific acceptability of the voiceprint technique. Detective
Lieutenant Ernest Nash then testified, over objection, that the
unknown voice recorded in the telephone conversation with the
property owner and the voice exemplar given by Hodo came
from the same person.4
Hodo initially sought, under California Penal Code section
995," to set aside the information for lack of probable cause.

2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 96 (West 1972) states in pertinent part:
Every juror, or person drawn or summoned as a juror . .. who either:
(1) makes any promise or agreement to give a verdict or deciis punishable by fine not exceeding
sion for or against any party ...
five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the State Prison not exceeding five years.
3. CAL. PEN. CODE § 93 (West 1972) states in pertinent part:
who asks, receives, or agrees to receive, any
juror ...
Every ...
bribe, upon any agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, or
decision upon any matters or question which is or may be brought before him for decision, shall be influenced thereby, is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison not less than one nor more than ten
years.
4. Professor of the Department of Audiology and Speech Science and
Physics at Michigan State University and principal investigator under a $300,000
grant from the United States Department of Justice to conduct a study of the
validity of voiceprints, Dr. Tosi has testified as to the reliability and acceptability
of voiceprints in over 25 cases across the nation. A partial list of cases where
he or his principal collaborator, Lieutenant Ernest Nash of the Michigan Department of State Police, Voice Identification Unit, perform identifications
through voice prints, may be found in TRIAL, January/February 1973, at 48.
Detective Lieutenant Ernest Nash has been the officer in charge of the Voice
Identification Unit of the Scientific Crime Laboratory of the Michigan State
Police since 1967.
Judge Warren McGuire noted in People v. Chapter, 13 C.L. 2479 (Marin Co.
Super. Ct., July 23, 1973), a California case in which voiceprint evidence was excluded subsequent to the instant appeal, that, ".

.

. in 20 out of 25 cases in which

testimony by Lieutenant Nash and Dr. Tosi has been admitted: 'there has been no
opposing expert testimony. . .

.'"

San Jose Post-Record, September 11, 1973,

at 1, col. 3. As in the majority of the above cases, there were no experts opposing the admission of voiceprints into evidence in the instant case.
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 995 (West 1972) provides:
The indictment or information must be set aside by the court in which
the defendant is arraigned, upon his motion, in either of the following
cases:
If it be an indictment:
1. Where it is not found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed
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Following the trial court's denial of this motion, he took an interlocutory appeal, seeking a writ of prohibition to exclude the voiceprint identification and show that there was no probable cause to
bind him over for trial. The court of appeal denied the writ
and remanded the case to superior court.

No further appeal was

taken.
The sole issue in seeking the writ of prohibition was the ad-

missibility of voiceprint evidence in California courts. The court
of appeal affirmed the admissibility of voiceprint evidence, reasoning that when voiceprints were excluded in 1968 in People
v. King,' the testimony showed that voiceprints did not, at that
time, meet the standards for admissibility of scientific evidence in
California.7 "The test for the admissibility of scientific testing is
whether or not it has received general acceptance by recognized
experts in the field."' This test does not require that all experts
in this code.
2. That the defendant has been indicted without reasonable or
probable cause.
If it be an information:
1. That before the filing thereof the defendant had not been legally committed by a magistrate.
2. That the defendant had been committed without reasonable or
probable cause.
6. 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968). King is the sole
previous appellate ruling on the issue of the admissibility of voiceprints in California.
7. In People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968),
Lawrence Kersta, an electrical engineer who had spent some years at Bell
Telephone Laboratories developing the voiceprint technique, testified that in his
opinion voiceprints should have been accepted into evidence. The prosecution
wished to use voiceprints to identify King as the interviewee on a television program who had admitted burning a Thrifty Drug Store during the Watts riots.
Kersta's testimony' that the voiceprint process is entirely subjective and was
without general acceptance within the scientific community formed the basis for
the court's refusal to admit voiceprints into evidence under the California rule
for such admission. See note 8 infra.
8. Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 784, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547,
550 (1973), citing Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51
Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966); People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478
(1968); People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
Each of these cases states the California rule, which is substantially the same as
the federal rule on this point as stated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923):
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
An example of the significance which may attach to the admission or rejection
of expert testimony: Frye was convicted of murder after "lie detector" test results
which were favorable to him were excluded. After serving three years in prison,
he was released when the real murderer confessed. San Jose Post-Record,
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in the field be familiar with the scientific procedure involved and
accept it, but rather that the procedure be generally accepted

by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.
Dr. Tosi testified at the preliminary examination that since
King, laboratory tests conducted under his guidance had changed
the attitude of the scientific community. Dr. Tosi submitted a
long list of those among his colleagues who now share his opin-

ion regarding the reliability of the voiceprint technique.' Without receiving opposing expert testimony on this point, the superior
court admitted the voiceprints, citing Wigmore's statement of the

rule for admitting scientific evidence:
When the testimony . . . appears to the ordinary layman
to lack a rational basis and is founded on observations made
with esoteric methods or apparatus . . .the method should
be explained by the witness and if it be vouched for as accepted in his branch of learning, it suffices to admit his
testimony.10

In affirming the admissibility of voiceprints, the appellate
court failed to establish any limits on the use of this technique.

The court specifically did not limit admissibility to the preliminary hearing context presented by the facts of the case before

it. Implicit in the court's failure to set limitations is the suggestion
that voiceprints may be admitted as direct evidence at future trials.
This decision, therefore, appears to take California law well beyond that of other jurisdictions," which have admitted voice-

prints for the limited purpose of corroborating other evidence.
September 1, 1973, at 1, col. 4. Even today "lie detector" tests are still not
considered reliable enough for admission into evidence in most jurisdictions.
See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
9. The inclusion of Dr. Peter Ladefoged, Professor of Phonetics in charge
of the Phonetics Laboratory at U.C.L.A., is notable. Dr. Ladefoged has been an
outspoken critic of voiceprints. His reservations regarding the admissibility of
voiceprints and his opinion that voiceprints have not been generally accepted are
reported in Jones, Danger-Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549,
566-67, 570-71 (1973). His recent comment that in spite of Lt. Nash's identification in Chapter, he could not see "how anybody could think the voices are
likely to be the same" (San Francisco Chronicle, July 18, 1973, at 49, Col. 4)
implies that he still lacks confidence in the voiceprint technique.
10. Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 785, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547,
550-51 (1973). Wigmore bases this rule on the rationale expounded in People v.
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 861, 331 P.2d 251, 253 (1958) admitting testimony on the use of N-allylnormorphine (Nalline) in detecting narcotic addiction. In that case, each physician testifying as a witness had familiarized himself with studies and articles in medical periodicals, and "[nlone had
ever read or heard anything critical or derogatory concerning the Nalline test."
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 659, at 276 (Supp. 1972).
In the instant case, Dr. Tosi vouched for the acceptability of a technique
on which there is a clear split of opinion amongst authorities in his field.
See note 9 supra. The function served by Dr. Tosi's testimony is not analogous
to the function served by expert testimony in Williams.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D.D.C. 1972)
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The admissibility of voiceprints in Hodo is clearly dependent
upon scientific proof of reliability gathered since the King decision
and the resulting acceptance of voiceprints as a reliable tool by
the scientific community.
Although it is not unusual for an expert to testify as to the
acceptability in the scientific community of his specialized form
of evidence, Dr. Tosi is in a rather unique position. He is not a
dispassionate observer with regard to the scientific community's
opinion of voiceprints. He has worked carefully for a period of
years to establish the validity of the technique, and has become
one of its principal spokesmen.
In 1968, Dr. Tosi testified in State v. Cary" that the court
in New Jersey should not consider the voiceprint identification
method, since he did not have evidence to prove the validity of
the technique. There is considerable testimonial evidence from
other cases which shows that his opinion reflected the belief of
the scientific community at the time.'" Since then, the sole significant study in this field has been conducted under Dr. Tosi's
direction, and Dr. Tosi testified in Hodo that the skepticism of
earlier years has been dispelled by his work.
There is no doubt that Dr. Tosi's experiments are themselves highly regarded by the scientific community. 14 However,
there is no such uniform support for Dr. Tosi's attempt to generalize his findings to all possible cases.' 5 Dr. Tosi's testimony
that the scientific community has generally accepted voiceprints,
based upon the results of his extensive testing of only 250 voices,
tends to undercut the distinction which the appellate court drew
between Hodo and King. The court stated:
The foundation for the admissibility of voiceprint identification in King was based upon the testimony of Mr. Law(limited to the facts of the case, the voiceprint identification was submitted to the
jury for their judgment of its probative value); United States v. Wright, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967) (voiceprints accepted because other
identification testimony existed); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972)

(sufficient other evidence existed that the court did not reach the question of the
sufficiency of voiceprint evidence alone); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1972) (voiceprints admitted solely for the purpose of corroboration);
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 241 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (voiceprints admitted for the purpose of corroborating other testimony).
12. 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968).
13. See, e.g., the testimony of Drs. Gerstman, Clarke, Joos, and Ladefoged
in People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 453-55, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 488-90
(1968).
14. 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549, 566 (1973). Dr. Ladefoged has stated that
he has read Dr. Tosi's report carefully and he considers it to be an excellent
study, carried out with true scientific objectivity. Drs. Ladefoged, Bolt, Cooper,
David, Denes, Pickett, and Stevens also agree that Tosi's work is competent
within its limitations.
15. Id. at 566-67.
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rence Kersta. Mr. Kersta is obviously a pioneer in this field
and apparently something of a zealot whose enthusiasm for
his subject carried his opinion beyond the area of acceptance either in the scientific community or in legal circles.
Based upon the record before the court in King, we would
have no hesitancy in agreeing with the result reached in
that case. However, four years have elapsed since King and
further research in the field as related by Dr. Tosi persuades
us that the time has come to accept this type of evidence
in courts. 16

Thus, the difference between the two cases appears, in the
view of the appellate court, to turn on the relative reliability of the
testimony of Dr. Tosi and Mr. Kersta. Therefore, a comparison of the two men should deal with their relative objectivity as
well as the nature and quality of the research contribution made
by Dr. Tosi since the date of King. The court's comparison
reaches only the men's credentials and the extent of their research. In the court's analysis: Mr. Kersta is "purely an engineer" holding a Master's degree, while Dr. Tosi has not one, but
two Doctorates; as of the date of King, Kersta had published only
a single article in a scientific journal, while Dr. Tosi has published 2 books and 35 papers in scientific journals; Mr. Kersta's
tests employed 123 persons, while Dr. Tosi's employed 250 in
35,000 tests; and finally, Mr. Kersta's identification study was
termed voice 17classification, while Dr. Tosi's was termed voice
identification.
On the basis of that comparison the court found that:
Mr. Kersta, on a narrow statistical base entertained the
subjective opinion that [voiceprints] were [reliable]. Dr.
Tosi, after extensive subsequent experiments and research,
has now overcome his initial skepticism and now is of the
opinion that they are reliable. Based upon the record in this
case, we agree.' 8
There is, however, a gap in the logic employed to reach this conclusion.
16. 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 785, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547, 551 (1973). See note 7
supra, where it is noted that Kersta testified in King that voiceprints had not
yet received general acceptance. Thus despite the Hodo court's characterization
of him, Kersta appears to be a conservative researcher, not a zealot. The court
should logically hold more suspect Dr. Tosi's assertion that his work has resulted in acceptance of voiceprints by the scientific community. Dr. Tosi's
testimony in Hodo would deny that there still exists a controversy over voiceprints, which is clearly erroneous. Kersta's position, referred to in note 7
supra, is both more moderate than Tosi's statement, and a closer reflection of
the opinion prevailing at the time it was made.
17. While Mr. Kersta's formal degree is in engineering, he has pursued research as a scientist for many years. His field of expertise is sound spectrography, in which he has made numerous technical presentations.
18. 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 786, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547, 551 (1973).
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At the time of King, the skepticism of the scientific community concerned with voiceprints was based on two unresolved
issues. The first was whether the variation in voice quality in a
given speaker (intraspeaker variability) was less than the variation between speakers (interspeaker variability). The second
was whether the voiceprint technique could definitively identify
individual speakers. Mr. Kersta had attempted to settle the second of these issues by a series of tests on the recorded voices of
123 workers at Bell Telephone Laboratories.
Through these
tests he was able to demonstrate the ability to consistently identify
the speakers in voice recordings. There were, however, two
faults in his program which raised doubts as to its validity. First,
each "unknown" voice specimen belonged to a subject in his
group of 123, forming a "closed" testing group. As a result, the
operator knew that there had to be a match between the unknown
specimen and at least one of his available specimens. In practice,
the unknown voice specimen must be compared against an "open"
group, where there may or may not be such a match. Therefore,
Kersta's experiments cannot be said to prove the reliability of
voiceprint identification in a non-laboratory situation. The reliability of Kersta's tests was also limited by the fact that the
group of voices was heterogeneous. That is, the voices were a diverse group, randomly selected, with gross differences among them.
Kersta did not demonstrate the capability of voiceprints to distinguish between similar voices.
Dr. Tosi's tests were designed to remedy these defects in
Kersta's work, and showed the ability of voiceprints to function in an open set situation, with a homogeneous set of voices.
All of his subjects spqke non-accented general-American English,
with no noticeable speech defects; were male undergraduate students; and ranged in age from 17 to 27.1' It is precisely this
homogeneity that limits the generality of his results. Cautious
scientists accept the fact that voiceprints can be used to distinguish between general-American English speaking males of the
above description, but are unwilling to extrapolate the results to
females or groups with a distinctive dialect.20 ". . [A] large
number of factors are involved in measuring reliability of voice
19. Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Redrey, Nicol & Nash, Experiment on Voice
Identification, 51 J. ACOUST. Soc. AMEr,. 2030, 2033 (1972).
20.
[A]t the moment, we do not know if different communities are equally
likely to contain a similar number of con/usable voices. There may
be a larger number of similar voices in the group of young middleclass
suburbanites living in a Chicago housing tract, or in a group of militant
black nationalists living in Watts, than in Tosi's 250 students who almost

certainly contained people from different backgrounds. .
11 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 549, 567 (1973) (emphasis added).

..
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identification and . . . Tosi ha[s] investigated only some of these:
a small subset."'
Thus even the second issue, the ability to definitively identify speakers, has not yet been settled to the satisfaction of the
scientific community. The first issue, whether magnitude of intraspeaker variation in voice pattern can be shown to be less than
interspeaker variation, has not even been addressed. The basis
for skepticism by the scientific community has therefore not been
appreciably altered. In light of this lack of scientific proof, it becomes clear that the Hodo court erred in relying solely on Dr.
Tosi's opinion that voiceprints have been accepted as reliable by
the scientific community. In a recent interview with Dr. Peter Ladefoged of the U.C.L.A. phonics laboratory, he implicitly rejected an22
in a trial,
application of the voiceprint technique, as evidence
and a study of the probative value of voiceprints for the Acoustical Society of America by Drs. Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Stevens and Pickett, concluded that "the available results are inadequate to establish the reliability of voice identification by spectrograms."2 3 Even after analyzing the results of Dr. Tosi's study,
the Acoustical Society group did not change its opinion that voiceprints are unreliable.2 4
Although under carefully controlled laboratory conditions
voiceprints have been used to distinguish between members of a
group of 250 speakers of similar speech pattern with 94% cer25 The most
tainty, in field applications errors have come to light.
26
recent example of error occurred in People v. Chapter, where
Lieutenant Nash failed to recognize that he was making a comparison between the words "E-O One" in Chapter's voice exem27
Nash misidentified Chapplar and "Eight-O One" in others.
ter in a demonstration of identification capability before Judge
McGuire; 28 further he failed to reveal a memo in his working
inconclusive. 29
notes which indicated that his identification was
This is the type of error which courts may justifiably fear.
21. Id. at 568. This was a statement by Dr. Denes and Dr. Pickett.
22. See Dr. Ladefoged's statement regarding the lack of reliability of the
voiceprint identification in the Chapter case, note 9 supra.
23. Speaker Identification by Speech Spectograms: A Scientist's View of its
Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. AcousT. Soc. AMER. 597, 603 (1970).
24. 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549, 566-68 nn. 107-9 (1973), cites opinions by
these men disapproving the use of voiceprints as evidence in May and November
1972, considerably after the publication of the Tosi study.
25. See, id. at 567 n.110, where an instance of mistaken voiceprint identification is detailed. Although the error was eventually discovered, the
misidentification had a drastic effect on the victim's career.
26. 13 CR. L. 2479 (Marin Co. Super. Ct. July 23, 1973).
27. San Jose Post-Record, September 12, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
28. San Jose Post-Record, September 11, 1973, at 4, col. 4.
29. Id. at 4, col. 5.
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Courts must be especially wary of admitting this kind of
evidence because the demonstrative nature of sound spectrographs,
coupled with their apparent validity when admitted into evidence,
can result in an excessive reliance on these exhibits by juries. A
consideration of the lack of experimental proof of the reliability of
voiceprint identification under field conditions, the likelihood that
such evidence will overshadow other more reliable evidence when
considered by a jury, and the patent errors which have been uncovered should lead courts to exclude voiceprints for any purpose.30 The expert evidence relied upon in Hodo justifies neither the court's attempt to distinguish that case from King nor
its ultimate admission of voiceprint evidence.
Alan L. Tanenbaum
30. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1972):
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the
jury.

